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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Po l i c y  Re s e a R c h Wo R k i n g  Pa P e R 4403-
The generation, diffusion, absorption and application of 
new technology, knowledge or ideas are crucial drivers of 
development. This paper surveys the diverse approaches 
to innovation adopted by East Asian economies, the 
problems faced and outcomes achieved, as well as possible 
policy lessons. Knowledge flows from advanced countries 
remain the primary source of new ideas in developing 
economies. The authors evaluate the role of three main 
channels for knowledge flows to East Asia - international 
trade, acquisition of disembodied knowledge and 
foreign direct investment. The paper then looks at the 
exceptionally fast growth in domestic innovation efforts 
in Korea, Taiwan (China), Singapore and China, drawing 
on information about R&D as well as original analysis 
This paper—a product of the Chief Economist Office in the World Bank's East Asia and Pacific Region —is part of a larger 
effort in the Region to better understand the conditions and policies conducive to innovation and productivity growth in 
East Asia. . Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be 
contacted at mbrahmbhatt@worldbank.org. 
of patent and patent citation data. Citation analysis 
shows that while East Asian innovations continue to 
draw heavily on knowledge flows from the US and Japan, 
citations to the same or to other East Asian economies 
are quickly rising, indicating the emergence of national 
and regional knowledge stocks as a foundation for 
innovation. A last section pulls together findings about 
policies and institutions to foster innovation, under three 
heads: the overall business environment for innovation 
(macroeconomic stability, financial development, 
openness, competition, intellectual property rights and 
the quality of communications infrastructure), human 
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I  Introduction 
Many economies in East Asia have achieved unprecedented growth in output and living 
standards over recent decades. Some have caught up or are fast catching up with the developed 
world, though it is less clear whether they can sustain the growth momentum, now that they are 
approaching the world technology frontier. Others remain at middle and low income levels of 
economic development. Whether they can catch up with and replicate their fast growing 
neighbors’ success remains an open question.  
This paper looks at the diverse approaches employed by East Asian economies to foster 
innovation, the varying outcomes they have achieved and the potential policy lessons from their 
experience.  This focus is in part predicated on modern endogenous growth theory, which 
regards the generation, diffusion, absorption and application of new technologies, knowledge or 
ideas as among the crucial drivers of economic growth and development.
2  We attempt to 
examine the extent, the modes and other characteristics of innovation in East Asia using a range 
of quantitative measures to compare East Asia to other developing and developed regions, as 
well as to contrast the wide range of experiences within East Asia.  We also provide a critical 
survey of selected aspects of the vast and rapidly growing literature on innovation, to place the 
East Asian experience in the context of key research findings and broader global trends.    
We adopt a broad definition of innovation which includes the introduction of new or 
improved goods, services, production processes and  marketing methods, as well as better modes 
of business organization in general.  The basic requirement is that the innovation be new to the 
firm that adopts it, even though it may not be new in the world at large.
 3  Viewed in this 
perspective, the kinds of activities that lead to innovation cover a wide ground.  On the one hand 
they include systematic, long term, large scale Research and Development (R&D) investments, 
typically undertaken by business firms, resulting in a stream of discoveries that add to the 
frontiers of global knowledge, that can be patented and which are the principal source of the 
firm’s competitiveness and profitability.  On the other, most innovation by firms in developing 
countries does not entail this kind of advance in the frontier of global knowledge, but, instead, 
                                                 
2 Thus Romer (1993) stresses the importance of overcoming ‘idea gaps’ relative to ‘object gaps’ in the process of 
development, that is, of overcoming barriers to the creation and absorption of productive ideas versus gaps in the 
availability of objects such as factories or raw materials.  See also Romer (1990a, 1990b) and Aghion and Howitt 
(1992, 2005).  . 
3 The OECD ‘s 2005 Oslo Manual of Guidelines for Collecting and Interpreting Innovation Data explicitly follows 
Joseph Schumpeter’s pioneering 1934 analysis by defining innovation broadly as “the implementation of a new or 
significantly improved product (good or service), or process, a new marketing method, or a new organizational 
method in business practices, workplace organisation or external relations.”  The basic requirement for an 
innovation in this approach is that it be new to the firm implementing it, including not only products, processes or 
methods originally developed by the firm but also those adopted from other firms or organizations.  Innovation 
activities are defined as “all scientific, technological, organisational, financial and commercial steps which actually, 
or are intended to, lead to the implementation of innovations.”  Innovation activities include not only Research and 
Experimental Development (R&D), but also acquisition of external technology (for example purchases of patents 
and non-patented inventions, licenses, know-how, trademarks and designs from other firms), acquisition of capital 
goods, both those embodying improved technological performance and those with no improvement but which are 
required for the implementation of new or improved products or processes, and a wide range of other activities 
needed to prepare an innovation, such as industrial design, engineering and set-up, trial production, patent and 
license work, production start-up and testing.  (OECD, 2005).    4
‘catching up’ to the global frontier, through adoption and adaptation of existing knowledge, most 
often from abroad.    
East Asia provides an ideal laboratory for studying this broad spectrum of innovation 
activities because of the unusually wide range of economic development levels of countries in 
the region,  extending from high income emerging economies like Korea, Singapore and Taiwan 
(China), which now conduct formal R&D and patenting at the levels of the most advanced 
developed countries, to middle income economies like Indonesia or low income economies like 
Cambodia that conduct very little or none of these formal innovation activities.  What is common 
to most East Asian economies though, is their success in absorbing knowledge from abroad.   
The paper therefore begins by examining the channels through which economies have drawn on 
foreign knowledge, drawing in part on the World Bank’s firm level Investment Climate Surveys.   
While it is hard to establish causal relationships, a distinctive feature of East Asian 
economies is their exceptionally high engagement in international trade. The Bank’s investment 
climate surveys show that firms in low and middle income East Asian economies rate imports of 
capital equipment as their most important source of new technology. We also survey other 
potential channels for international technology transfers and spillovers that have been suggested 
in the literature, including through exports and foreign direct investment.  While the econometric 
evidence is mixed, a rich body of case study literature argues that East Asian firms may have 
derived significant technological benefits from exports under longer term Original Equipment 
Manufacturing (OEM) contracts, as part of the global production networks of foreign 
multinationals (a model of technological development sometimes described as supplier-oriented 
industrial upgrading).  East Asian economies have varied more widely in their openness to FDI 
than they have in their engagement in trade. Here evidence for technology transfers through 
‘vertical’ relationships between local firms and MNC affiliates (another form of supplier–
oriented upgrading) is more convincing than for other channels that have been suggested. 
We then document trends in indigenous knowledge creation within East Asia, using the 
growth and distribution of R&D and patenting.  Over the last decade East Asian R&D spending 
grew much more than in any other region, but disparities in spending between economies also 
widened.  Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs) like Korea, Singapore and Taiwan (China) 
now devote 2 percent or more of GDP to R&D, among the highest in the world, with the 
business sector generally performing over two thirds of R&D.  China has also been rapidly 
boosting its R&D spending towards an official target of 1.5 percent of GDP.  On the other hand 
middle income economies such as Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand spend a miniscule 0.1-0.2 
percent of GDP on R&D.   The skewness of the distribution of R&D activity in East Asia is 
dwarfed only by the uneven distribution of the patents secured by East Asian economies.   
Patenting per capita in the NIEs has grown at a pace four times that in the developed world, and 
is now approaching average developed country levels, while, on the other hand, it remains 
negligible in most middle and low income economies of the region.  
The increasing preeminence of the R&D capability of East Asia’s NIEs raises the 
possibility of increasing technology diffusion within East Asia. We take the hypothesis to a data 
set of patent citations. As would be expected, East Asian patents continue to draw heavily on 
knowledge flows from the US and Japan.  But citations to other ‘compatriot’ patents from the 
same East Asian economy or to other East Asian economies are quickly rising, indicating the 
emergence of East Asian national and regional knowledge stocks which are now providing an 
indigenous or regional foundation for new innovations and for cross-border knowledge flows.   5
Several key findings emerge from our analysis of technology transfer and indigenous 
innovation in East Asia. First, technology transfer from abroad and indigenous R&D 
complement each other at all levels of income, although the balance between the two may 
change.  Even in poor economies, some indigenous innovation effort increases the country’s 
capacity to absorb knowledge from abroad. No matter which channel or - more accurately - 
which combination of channels is employed, the extent and quality of technology transfer from 
abroad is highly dependent on the absorptive or learning capacity of the domestic economy, 
which in turn depends on the education and training of the labor force, the extent of domestic 
R&D and domestic innovation effort more generally.  Conversely – a point less well known - 
cutting-edge innovation that advances the global frontier of knowledge itself remains highly 
dependent on access to the accumulated stock of knowledge worldwide, through technology 
transfers or knowledge spillovers of various kinds.  It seems there are strong positive feedback 
loops between domestic innovation and acquiring knowledge from abroad, with each being 
necessary for and enhancing the other.     
Second, East Asian experience confirms that sound fundamentals such as macroeconomic 
stability, financial sector development, protection of property rights and adequate provision of 
core public goods are as important for innovation as for general investment. In addition, 
knowledge itself has strong public good characteristics which create a theoretical rationale for 
more direct government interventions in support of innovation, including not only the creation of 
a specialized system of intellectual property rights (IPRs), but also public funding for basic 
research and, possibly, fiscal incentives for business R&D.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II examines evidence on knowledge 
adoption and adaptation in East Asia in particular that drawn from the World Bank’s Investment 
Climate Surveys. Section III tracks trends in indigenous knowledge creation within East Asia, in 
particular the growth and distribution of R&D. We use patents as an indicator of innovation 
output to investigate the extent East Asia is approaching the world technology frontier in Section 
IV, which also summarizes results from estimating a knowledge diffusion model using citation 
data. The last section concludes by drawing implications of policies and institutions that may 
help foster domestic innovation as well as absorption of knowledge from abroad.     6
II  Absorbing Knowledge from Abroad – International Technology Transfer and 
Spillovers 
  Close to 80 percent world R&D is carried out in the developed world.  It is thus not 
surprising that most innovation by firms in developing countries does not entail advances in the 
frontier of global knowledge, but, instead, catching up to the frontier through adoption and 
adaptation of existing products, processes and methods which, while they are new to the 
developing country firm, are not new to the world, typically originating from firms and other 
innovators in advanced countries.   
What is perhaps less well known is that acquisition of knowledge from abroad remains 
crucial at all levels of development.  Eaton and Kortum (1996) estimate that foreign sources of 
technology account for at least 80 percent of domestic productivity growth in most OECD 
countries, the only exceptions being the US and Japan.  Cutting-edge innovation that advances 
the global frontier of knowledge would itself be difficult without access to the accumulated stock 
of scientific and technical knowledge worldwide, through technology transfers or knowledge 
spillovers of various kinds.  Bottazi and Peri (2005) estimate that a 1 percent increase in US 
R&D leads to a 0.35 percent rise in knowledge creation (patenting) in other OECD countries 
within 10 years. Access to foreign knowledge in turn depends on (among other things) exposure 
to and interaction with international scientific, technical and research communities within firms, 
universities and other private and public bodies, be this through direct exchanges of information 
or through trade, investment and other international economic transactions.  
The first part of this section draws on the World Bank’s firm-level Investment Climate 
Surveys to provide an overview of broadly defined innovation activity among low and middle 
income economies in East Asia and elsewhere.  The section then looks in more detail at some of 
the principal channels through which countries absorb knowledge from abroad. These include 
through imports of products that embody new technologies, through purchasing or licensing new 
technology, and, lastly, through technology transfers and spillovers that might arise through 
exporting, especially under long term contracts as part of the global production networks of 
foreign multinationals, or from the local affiliates of multinational firms (foreign direct 
investment). 
A common theme that emerges from this discussion is that, no matter which channel or - 
more accurately - which combination of channels is employed, the extent and quality of 
knowledge absorption from abroad is dependent on the absorptive or learning capacity of the 
domestic economy.  This in turn depends on the education and training of the labor force and on 
the extent and quality of domestic R&D and of the domestic innovation effort more generally.  
Knowledge absorption from abroad needs a domestic technical capacity which can master, adapt 
and adjust foreign knowledge, to make it useful for local circumstances.  This need arises 
because much of knowledge, especially at the practical level, is difficult to codify into explicit 
protocols, instructions or formulas.  It is tacit knowledge, requiring costly face to face 
interactions and learning processes to master.  As Cohen and Levinthal (1989) point out, R&D 
itself has two faces:  innovation and learning.  Domestic R&D not only generates new 
knowledge but it also enhances the firm’s ability to assimilate and exploit existing knowledge.  
Thus developing country firms are more likely to benefit from FDI spillovers if they conduct 
some R&D themselves.  They are more likely to selected as suppliers to sophisticated global 
production networks if they already possess significant in-house design, engineering and other   7
technical capabilities.  Overall, then, it appears that domestic innovation and efforts to acquire 
knowledge from abroad are mutually supportive activities. 
 
Innovation Outcomes in Developing East Asia: A Broad Perspective 
Table 1 presents information from the World Bank’s firm-level Investment Climate 
Surveys on innovation outcomes in six low and middle income East Asian economies (and for an 
average for 39-43 other developing economies), showing the proportion of firms that carried out 
one of ten innovations in the three years preceding the survey. The term “innovation” here 
follows the broad Schumpeterian sense used by the OECD, as the implementation of any “new or 
significantly improved product …or  process” including new marketing or organizational 
methods in business practices.  The most common forms of innovation among these developing 
economies include introducing a new product or upgrading an existing product line, as well as 
introducing a new technology that substantially changes how the main product is produced. On 
average more than 40 percent of firms had undertaken these activities in both East Asia and 
elsewhere. The rankings of different types of innovation in East Asia are broadly similar to those 
elsewhere, with some interesting and statistically significant exceptions.  East Asian firms are 
more likely to upgrade their product lines, perhaps the result of their greater reliance on export 
markets and the need to respond to  the rapidly changing product specifications demanded by 
foreign buyers.  They are also more likely to outsource parts of their business operations, 
suggesting that firms in the region are more relentless in seeking to cut costs, perhaps reflecting a 
more competitive environment.  


















(1) New product line  0.53  0.38  0.28  0.49  0.50  0.44  0.44  0.40 
(2) Upgraded product line  0.90  0.68  0.49  0.64 0.71 0.66  0.68*  0.56 
(3) Intro. new technology (1)  0.60  0.22  0.29  0.42  0.52  0.45  0.44  0.40 
(4)Discontinued product line  0.05  0.22  0.20  0.42 0.19 0.19  0.21  0.23 
(5)Opened new plant  0.18  0.07  0.11  0.13  0.08    0.11  0.14 
(6)Closed existing plant  0.02  0.08  0.05  0.11 0.02    0.06*  0.11 
(7)New foreign JV  0.21  0.06  0.05  0.06  0.04  0.06  0.08  0.08 
(8)New license agreement  0.21 0.08  0.06  0.13 0.11 0.10  0.13  0.14 
(9)Outsourcing   0.33  0.13  0.09  0.21  0.18  0.09  0.17*  0.09 
(10)Insourcing  0.41 0.10  0.07  0.14 0.11    0.17  0.10 
  Core:  (1)+(3)  1.13  0.60  0.57  0.91  1.02  0.89  0.88  0.80 
  Dynamism (Sum of all 10)  3.44 2.02  1.69  2.75 2.46    2.49  2.25 
Source: World Bank Investment Climate Surveys.  http://iresearch.worldbank.org/InvestmentClimate/main.html, Ayyagari 
et al (2006). (1) New technology that substantially changes how main product is produced.  * Difference between means 
significant at the 5 percent level. 
  
There are also interesting differences between East Asian economies.  Even though firms 
in low income Cambodia do not do formal R&D or make cutting-edge innovations (they 
received no US patents at all), they are among the most active in adoption and adaptation 
activities as defined in the Investment Climate Surveys, with over half the firms in the sample 
introducing or upgrading product lines and production processes.  Low income status is clearly   8
no bar to firm dynamism.  Firms in Thailand are also relatively innovative on these measures, 
while those in Indonesia and Malaysia have been relative laggards.   
Ayyagari et al (2006) find several correlates of firm innovation in this sample of 
developing country firms.  First, core innovation outcomes are higher among younger (more 
recently created) firms, larger firms and firms with high capacity utilization. Second, these 
broader measures of innovation are not closely related to per capita income, suggesting that, 
given favorable economic and institutional conditions, firms can be highly innovative in this 
broad sense in even the poorest economies.  (As we show later, formal R&D and sophisticated 
innovations that lead to patents are different, rising sharply with per capita income).  Third, there 
is a strong negative association between state ownership and innovation, but there is no 
discernable difference whether a firm is a domestic or foreign privately owned firm.  Fourth, 
there is a strong association between innovation and most types of external financing (equity 
finance, local or foreign owned commercial bank loans, lease finance, investment funds, trade 
credits and funds from family and friends).
4   The study also finds a positive association between 
innovation and the extent of competition faced by firms. 
Table 2. Most Important Source of Technological Innovation – 2003 (% of Firms) 
  Cambodia Indonesia Malaysia Philippines    Thailand    Average 
Embodied in new machinery   42.1  48.7  49.9  43.0  33.1  43.4 
Cooperation with clients  11.9 15.1  8.6 9.7  17.2  12.5 
By hiring key personnel  14.5  17.9  11.4  14.2  3.0  12.2 
Developed within the firm locally 16.1  4.7  7.2  8.3  19.4  11.1 
Transferred from parent   6.0  2.7  11.0  4.3  11.8  7.2 
Developed with supplier  1.6 7.0  5.2  5.0  7.2  5.2 
Other  7.8  3.9  6.7  15.5  8.2  8.4 
Source:  World Bank.  Investment Climate Surveys.  Malaysia is 2002, Thailand is 2004. 
 
Finally the Bank’s Investment Climate Surveys also provide a view into the sources of 
knowledge that firms in these low and middle income economies use to make innovations.  Table 
2 shows that the single most important source of knowledge for firms in these East Asian 
economies (cited on average by over 40 percent) was technology embodied in new machinery or 
equipment (most of which can be assumed to be imported).  The next two most cited sources of 
innovation – those developed in cooperation with client firms and hiring of key personnel were 
cited by 12-13 percent of firms, while innovations developed or adapted within the firm were 
cited by only 11-12 percent.  These observations provide a good springboard for a more detailed 
inspection of the methods by which firms absorb knowledge from abroad.  
 
Technology Transfer through Imports 
Exceptionally high levels of international trade are a common feature across most East 
Asian economies, providing a variety of potential channels for acquisition of knowledge.  One is 
through the import of advanced capital equipment embodying new technologies that could either 
                                                 
4 The study uses instrumental variables to control for the obvious possibility of reverse causation – that external 
finance flows to more innovative firms – but finds that variable remains significant.   9
not have been produced at home at all, or only at much higher cost. Firms in newly 
industrializing economies like Korea and Taiwan (China) have often strengthened their 
technological understanding and capabilities by “reverse engineering” of imported capital 
equipment.  Exhibit 1 shows that East Asian ratios to GDP for imports of machinery and 
transport equipment (including much of what are classified as ‘high technology’ goods) are 
mostly well above levels associated with other countries at similar per capita income levels.
5 
Table 2 above showed that 3-4 times more firms in East Asian low and middle income 
economies reported capital equipment purchases as their most important means of acquiring 
technology.   
A number of studies have provided 
indirect evidence for the effectiveness of 
imports as a channel for knowledge 
acquisition, observing that R&D in OECD 
countries has a positive impact on other 
countries’ total factor productivity, and 
that this effect tends to rise with the 
recipient country’s openness to imports. 
(Coe and Helpman, 1995; Coe, Helpman 
and Hoffmeister, 1997.) Interestingly, East 
Asian Newly Industrialized Economies 
like Hong Kong, Singapore and Korea 
were found to have elasticities of TFP to 
foreign R&D stocks generally higher than 
the average for developing economies.     
Later studies have mainly confirmed and 
elaborated these results.  Keller (2002) is 
one of relatively few studies to look jointly 
at the impact of international trade, foreign 
direct investment and disembodied knowledge flows (for example through direct 
communication) as channels of knowledge flow.
6  He finds that all three channels are significant, 
but that imports are the most important, explaining about two thirds of the estimated impacts, 
while FDI and disembodied flows (as measured) explain about one sixth each on average.
7 
 
                                                 
5 Geographically small countries tend to export and import more per dollar of GDP than do large ones.  Exhibit 1 
shows import to GDP ratios after adjustment for this country size effect. 
6 Keller (2002) proxies disembodied knowledge flows by bilateral language skills – the proportion of the population 
recipient country who speak the language of the spillover sender country.  The study looks at knowledge flows at the 
industry level among countries at the world’s technology frontier – the G7 industrialized economies. 
7 Among other investigations, Xu and Wang (1999) find that imports of capital equipment provide a better index for 
measuring R&D spillovers than trade as a whole.  Schiff, Wang and Olarreaga (2002) look not only at the impact on 
developing countries’ productivity of R&D stocks accumulated in the ‘North’, but also those accumulated in the 
‘South’, i.e. in developing countries. They find that productivity in developing economies does rise with R&D in 
other developing economies (and thus with openness to these economies), but that the elasticity is smaller than with 
respect to R&D in the North.  They find that these kinds of South-South R&D spillovers are mostly important for 
industries that have a low R&D intensity, but not for high R&D intensity industries, which instead benefit most from 
R&D in the North (and openness to the North).   
Exhibit 1 
Machinery & Transport Equipment Imports* 
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*  After controlling for country size.
Source: World Bank World Development 
Indicators.  134 developing and developed 
economies.  10
Learning through Exports? 
The rapid, sustained growth of East Asian manufactured (and increasingly ‘high tech’) 
exports over recent decades draws attention to the potential role of exports as a channel for 
technology transfer.  At the simplest level exports provide the resources for imports of capital 
equipment that embody modern technologies.  Technology transfer may also be facilitated more 
directly by interactions between developing country exporters and their developed world 
customers, who have an incentive to help suppliers upgrade their technical capabilities, 
productivity and product quality.  Exhibit 2 corroborates that East Asian exports of machinery 
and transport equipment (containing much of what are classified as high technology products) 
are generally much higher than other economies at similar income levels. 
The potential for technology transfer from exporting has been emphasized especially in 
the case study literature.
8   Hobday (1995, 2000) stresses the role of Original Equipment 
Manufacturing (OEM) subcontracting in 
fostering industrial exports and technology 
transfer in Korea and Taiwan (China).   
Under the OEM system the supplier 
undertakes production (typically for thin 
profit margins) according to the design 
specifications of the foreign buyer, which 
then markets the product under its own 
brand name through its international 
distribution channels.  OEM production 
and exports in the NIEs built up rapidly 
during the 1970s and 1980s.  Some 70-80 
percent of Korea’s electronics exports 
were under OEM type contracts by 1990, 
while over 40 percent of Taiwan (China)’s 
computer hardware exports were of this 
form at around the same time.  Over the 
past 15 years OEM type contracting has 
also been central to the enormous 
expansion of manufactured exports from 
China,  Over the period the OEM model 
itself has developed into more complex patterns of global production networking in which first 
tier suppliers are themselves purchasers from second and third tier suppliers of their own.   
The potential benefits of OEM for developing country exporters include achieving 
economies of scale in production with less risk and cost than attempting to break into global 
markets on their own, as well as possible technology transfer and training from the customer.  By 
building up its technological capabilities in this way the firm can lay the groundwork for more 
sophisticated (and profitable) ventures, for example Original Design Manufacturing (ODM), in 
which the supplier also takes over responsibility for post-conceptual design and development of 
products sold under the customer’s brand,  and Original Brand Manufacturing (OBM), when it 
                                                 
8 For example, Hobday (1995, 2000), Kim (1997), Matthews and Cho (2000), Kim and Lee (2002) and Nabeshima 
(2004) 
Exhibit 2 
Machinery & Transport Equipment Exports* 
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* After controlling for country size.
Source: World Bank World 
Development Indicators.  133 
developing and developed 
economies.  11
has mastered the entire product cycle of R&D, innovation, design, development, production and 
marketing under its own brand.  This sequential OEM-ODM-OBM path has been labeled the 
conventional model of supplier oriented industrial upgrading.  (Sturgeon and Lester, 2004).
9  
Samsung Electronics of Korea is a rare example of a developing country firm that has 
successfully traveled the whole of this road, building on OEM and technology licensing deals 
with advanced country MNCs like Sony, Toshiba, Philips and GTE in the 1980s, making huge 
efforts to build up its design capabilities, R&D and independent brand in the 1990s, till the 
present, when it has annual R&D expenditures of $4-5 billion (representing 8-9 percent of sales 
and employing close to a quarter of the workforce), and has the largest global market share for 
sales of DRAM and SRAM semiconductors, flash memories, TVs, monitors and LCD panels, as 
well as the second or third largest market shares for mobile phones and DVD players.
10   
Nevertheless, while the case study literature has stressed the opportunities for learning 
through exports, econometric evidence for this proposition is mixed.
11   There is certainly 
evidence that firms that export generally have significantly higher productivity than those that do 
not.  But this appears to be mainly the result of self selection by more productive firms, which 
are more likely to undertake the higher fixed costs and rigors of competing in international 
markets.  Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998), for example, find little evidence for learning effects 
from exports in plant level data from Colombia, Mexico and Morocco.  On the other hand, Kraay 
(2006) and Aw, Chen and Roberts (1997) do find some evidence that past export experience does 
help explain current productivity for Chinese and Taiwan (China) firms respectively.   
Seeking to explain the somewhat differing results of econometric and case studies, Pack 
(2006) observes that export data do not typically distinguish exports under long term OEM 
contracts from other types of exports, so it is perhaps not surprising that econometric studies 
based on generic export data arrive at only mixed results for export learning effects.  There is 
however a good deal of recent econometric evidence for the existence of technology transfers 
from multinational firm affiliates in a host country to their local suppliers in the same host 
country (discussed below).  Given this evidence for one form of supplier-oriented industrial 
upgrading, it may be reasonable to suggest that similar spillovers would also exist for another, 
that is, for cross-border trade carried out under long term OEM type contracts between an MNC 
purchaser abroad and developing country OEM exporter firms which are a part of its global 
production network. 
  Tybout (2006) also notes that many studies of export learning effects fail to take into 
account the possibility that future exporters may come into contact with and cooperate with 
potential foreign customers well before export flows actually take place.  Kim (1997) describes 
Samsung’s efforts to master production of microwave ovens in the 1970s in response to a 
prospective order from J.C. Penney, with improvements in productivity preceding actual export 
flows.  This and other case studies suggest that the relationship between exports and productivity 
is not simply a self-selection story, but also one in which firms make deliberate decisions to 
improve their productivity in order to serve export markets. Hallward-Driemer, Iarossi and 
Sokoloff (2002) provide firm level evidence for this hypothesis from five East Asian economies.  
                                                 
9 Benefits drawn by developing country firms which act as suppliers to local affiliates of foreign multinationals are 
another form of supplier-oriented industrial upgrading, a point returned to in the discussion of vertical FDI spillovers 
below.   
10 Data for 2004. 
11 The relevant literature is surveyed in Hoekman and Smarzynska-Javorcik (2006) and Tybout (2006).      12
Firms that are exporters from the time they are created have significantly higher productivity 
than firms that only become exporters later, and they also differ systematically in the training of 
their workforces, the vintage of their capital equipment, the use of outside auditors and other 
aspects of their production processes and operations.  They interpret this finding as evidence that 
the decision to export encourages firms to undertake productivity enhancing improvements, 
including, no doubt, in the technologies applied.  Hallward-Driemer et al point out that the gap in 
productivity between firms that began as exporters and others is largest and most significant in 
lower income economies like Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand, less so in Malaysia and 
essentially zero in the most developed economy, Korea.  They conclude that “to those concerned 
with policy...the message would be that it is the least developed economies that have the most to 
gain from measures that would broaden the markets they face”. 
Nevertheless, while developing country firms may have most to gain from taking on the 
challenges of exporting, they may also be the least well equipped to do so.  Nabeshima (2004) 
observes that to be selected as an OEM supplier firms already need to possess production and 
technological capabilities that allows them to meet demanding quality, cost and delivery 
requirements.  The requirements for attempting the transition to Original Design or Original 
Brand manufacturing are even greater, helping explain why firms like Samsung are among only 
very few developing country firms to have made the transition to primary reliance on internal 
R&D and its own global brands.   
Drawing on interviews with lead firms and suppliers in the electronics and auto parts 
industries, Sturgeon and Lester (2004) suggest that recent trends are raising the economies of 
scale and technological competencies required for participation in the global production 
networks of multinational companies, 
putting in question the usefulness of the 
supplier oriented model for many 
developing economies.  With excellent 
manufacturing performance and low 
costs being viewed as widely available 
and commodified, potential suppliers 
now also need to provide the lead firm 
with value-adding capabilities in 
product and component design, 
component sourcing, inventory 
management, testing, packaging and 
logistics.  Increasingly, suppliers also 
need to be global in scope, able to 
support their lead firms all over the world.  Lead firms are also less inclined to establish long 
term relationships with suppliers who threaten to turn into competitors, preferring to do business 
with ‘pure play’ OEM-ODM suppliers.   
Reflecting these trends, since the early 1990s lead firms in the electronics industry have 
outsourced a larger share of their supplier business to a small group of contract manufacturers 
which operate extensive global production networks to support the worldwide operations of their 
clients, including both high production volume sites in East Asia, Central and Eastern Europe 
and Mexico, as well as more specialized sites close to clients in developed economies.  (Ernst, 
2004).  As Table 3 indicates, most of the top contract manufacturers are firms from advanced 
Table 3 
Top 5 Electronic Contract Manufacturers  
1994 and 2004.  (Revenues  in $Mill.) 
1994 2004 
Company Revenue  Company  Revenue 
Sanmina 
(1)  2363  Flextronics
(3)  15355 
Celestica 
(2) 1989  Hon  Hai 
(4) 13190 
Solectron 
(1)  1642  Sanmina 
(1)  12205 
Jabil 
(1) 404  Solectron 
(1) 11638 
Flextronics 
(3)  211  Celestica 
(2)  8840 
(1) USA. 
(2) Canada. 
(3) Incorporated in Singapore; managed 
 from USA. 
(4) Taiwan (China). Sources:  Sturgeon and 
 Lester (2004); Electronic Business September 2005.    13
economies, with only a limited number of firms from Taiwan (China) having broken into the top 
ranks of this business.  The 1990s also saw a huge wave of investment in auto assembly and 
component supply plants in emerging markets, especially in China and elsewhere in East Asia.  
As in electronics, the major assemblers are increasingly outsourcing to a small number of 
component suppliers with global reach, typically advanced economy firms like Delphi, Visteon, 
Bosch, and Denso which take on increasing responsibility for design and supply of the major 
component modules going into an automobile, and which are able to co-locate near the 
assembler’s worldwide operations.  Doner, Noble and Ravenhill (2004, 2006) observe that these 
assembler strategies are tending to raise barriers to entry for developing country firms aiming to 
enter the global auto parts industry.   
According to these case studies, competitive pressures are raising the technological and 
scale thresholds required for East Asian firms to participate in global production networks.  If in 
the past low production costs were an adequate entry ticket for participation, today the price of 
entry also includes more sophisticated learning, innovation and design capabilities.   
 
Technology Licensing and Disembodied Knowledge Flows 
Firms can also purchase disembodied external knowledge through acquisition of patents, 
non-patented inventions, licenses, disclosures of know-how, trademarks, designs, patterns and 
other consultancy and technological services.  Royalty payments abroad provide a rough 
measure of this form of technology transfer.  
Exhibit 3 indicates that royalty payments 
abroad by East Asian economies are also 
generally much higher relative to other 
economies at similar income levels.  Firms 
may also derive disembodied knowledge 
flows through technological spillovers, 
benefiting from open source information 
such as scientific, technical and industry 
journals, informal contacts and 
communications through networks of 
researchers and specialists, trade and 
industry associations, trade fairs.   
Telecom systems are also an 
important channel for the flow of 
disembodied knowledge, as well as for 
facilitating international trade and 
coordination of multinational investment 
activity.  The importance of the ICT 
infrastructure for innovation and 
productivity growth is suggested in Wei-Kang Wong (2006).  This study looks at the impact of 
various types of cross-border flows on productivity and growth, including trade, FDI and 
disembodied knowledge flows, the latter proxied by international telephone traffic.  Interestingly, 
telephone traffic is found to have the most robust positive effect on productivity and income.   
 
Exhibit 3 
Royalty Payments (% of GDP) 
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developing and 
developed economies.  14
Foreign Direct Investment 
Historically East Asian economies have shown more differences in their reliance on FDI 
than they have done on openness to trade or technology licensing, although in recent years there 
has been some convergence towards more openness to FDI.  Historically, Korea and, to a lesser 
extent, Taiwan (China) have tended to restrict FDI while emphasizing licensing of foreign 
technology and upgrading of domestic technological capabilities, including through domestic 
R&D and strengthening of technical education and labor force skills.  Singapore, on the other 
hand, has welcomed FDI, while also fostering domestic technology efforts.  China too has drawn 
heavily on FDI inflows, emphasizing joint ventures, while more recently also emphasizing 
domestic R&D.  Middle income South 
East Asian economies like Malaysia, 
Thailand, Indonesia and Philippines (since 
the 1980s) have also been open to FDI, 
although, as we show in a later section, the 
level of indigenous technological effort in 
these economies (especially R&D) has 
been limited.
12   
Exhibit 4 shows a scatter plot of 
countries’ accumulated stocks of inward 
FDI (relative to GDP) versus land area.
13  
Consistent with their past history of 
relatively restrictive policies on FDI 
inflows, economies like Japan, Korea and 
Taiwan (China) have low stocks of inward 
FDI relative to other economies of 
comparable geographical size (or per 
capita income).  FDI stocks are also low 
relative to country size and per capita 
income in Philippines and Indonesia.  On 
the other hand, FDI stocks in economies like China, Hong Kong, Singapore, and most middle 
(and low) income economies in South East Asia are generally at or above the levels predicted by 
country size or (for the most part) per capita income, reflecting in part more open policies 
towards FDI.  (A partial exception to these observations is that, despite the high absolute flows 
of FDI to China in recent years, the stock of FDI relative to China’s GDP remains low compared 
to most other economies at a similar per capita income level).    It is also interesting to note 
(Exhibit 5) that while stocks of inward FDI in manufacturing in East Asia are generally higher 
than in other developing (or developed) regions, FDI in the much larger services sector of these 
economies is generally much lower.   
Theories of the multinational enterprise emphasize its role as an originator of new 
product and process innovations, managerial expertise, higher quality standards, and access to 
global export markets.  These theories suggest that multinationals opt for foreign direct 
investment rather than licensing their technology through arms length market transactions 
                                                 
12 Lall (2003) elaborates the strategies employed by East Asian economies to strengthen industrial competitiveness. 
13 There is a weak slightly positive correlation between FDI stocks and per capita income across countries.  There is 
however a more significant negative correlation between country size and FDI stocks as a share of GDP. 
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because of the significant public goods characteristics of knowledge, which prevent the firm 
from fully protecting its intangible knowledge assets in arms length transactions, and which lead 
it to deploy those assets within the protective boundaries of its own affilitates, through FDI.
 14   
FDI is expected to bring several potential benefits. Foreign affiliates of MNCs have 
easier access to superior parent company technology and achieve higher productivity in their 
operations, which, in a competitive environment, translates into higher wages for employees and 
higher welfare for consumers through 
making available better quality goods and 
services at lower prices.  FDI may also 
enhance productivity in the rest of the 
economy by increasing competition, or 
through spillovers of technology and 
expertise.  Here we review evidence for 
two propositions: does foreign ownership 
convey productivity benefits for the local 
firms or operations that are acquired or 
established by the MNC, and, if these 
benefits exist, do they “spillover” to other 
domestic non-acquired firms? 
First, does FDI convey large 
productivity benefits for the local 
operations that it acquires?  There is much 
evidence that such operations generally 
have higher labor productivity, total factor 
productivity and wages than local firms.   
What has not been clear is whether this 
superiority is due to restructuring and 
infusion of new technology by the new foreign owners, or, instead, it simply reflects foreign 
firms acquiring already superior local firms.  Recent research addresses this question using firm-
level data from the Census of Indonesian Manufacturing Plants from 1983 to 1996.  (Arnold and 
Javorik, 2004; World Bank, 2005b).
15  The analysis shows that Indonesian plants receive a rapid 
and large improvement in total factor productivity from foreign acquisition, averaging about 46 
percent.  (Exhibit 6). In the 1-2 years after acquisition, the acquired plants experience more rapid 
growth in output, employment, investment and wages than similar local plants.  The proportion 
of skilled workers in the plant labor force increases, as does export orientation and use of 
imported intermediates, all of which is consistent with significant plant restructuring after 
acquisition.   
                                                 
14 See for example Caves (1996) and Markusen (2002). 
15 Arnold and Javorcik (2004) “use a non-parametric matching estimator to calculate the causal effect of foreign 
ownership on plant productivity. The matching technique creates a missing counterfactual of an acquired firm had it 
remained under domestic ownership.  It does so by pairing up each future acquired plant with a domestic plant from 
the same sector and year that had observable characteristics very similar to the acquisition target prior to the foreign 
acquisition. … The causal effect of foreign ownership is hence estimated by the average divergence of the TFP 
growth paths between each acquired plant and its matched control plant, starting from the pre-acquisition year.” 
Exhibit 5 
Sectoral Composition of FDI Stock in 2002














Source: World Bank  (2004).  16
Second, does superior technology in MNC affiliates spillover to non-acquired domestic 
firms?  Spillovers are expected to occur when foreign owned firms are unable to fully internalize 
their superior knowledge.  They may 
occur through local firms copying 
products, technologies, methods or 
strategies from MNC affiliates, through 
observation (imitation) or by hiring 
workers trained by the affiliates (skill 
acquisition).  MNC entry could also lead 
to more competition in the host country 
market, forcing local firms to use existing 
resources more efficiently or to search for 
new technologies.
16 
Two types of spillovers are 
relevant: horizontal (or intra-industry) 
and vertical (or inter-industry) spillovers.  
Horizontal spillovers are those between 
competing firms in the same sector.  Here 
foreign firms will have a strong incentive 
to prevent their superior technology from 
leaking to local competitiors.  They may 
use intellectual property rights, secrecy, 
paying higher wages or locating in 
countries or industries where local firms have limited imitative capacity to prevent spillovers.   
Recent research tends to cast doubt on the existence of horizontal spillovers in 
developing countries.  Gorg and Greenaway (2004) review 40 studies on horizontal productivity 
spillovers in manufacturing industries worldwide and conclude that only 8 find unambiguous 
evidence of positive horizontal spillovers, mostly for developed economies.
17  On the other hand, 
several studies using firm-level panel data find evidence of negative effects of FDI on domestic 
firms, for example Aitken and Harrison’s analysis (1999) of Venezuela and Koning’s (2001) 
study of firms in Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland.  One suggested explanation for negative effects 
on the productivity of domestic firms is that greater competition from foreign invested firms 
reduces the market available to local firms in the short term, forcing them higher up their given 
cost curves (although in the longer run competition could also force local firms to improve 
efficiency (shift their cost curves downwards).   
The extent of horizontal FDI spillovers tend to depend on the absorptive capacity of the 
local economy for assimilating new knowledge. Differences in absorptive capacity would help 
                                                 
16 Das (1987) and Wang and Blomstrom (1992) look at the role of imitation; Haacker (1999), Fosfuri et al. (2001), 
and Djankov and Hoekman (2000) on skill acquisition; Blomström and Kokko (1998) and Glass and Saggi (2002) 
on competition. For a general literature review of FDI spillover channels see Gorg and Greenaway (2004). 
17 While 22 studies find positive and significant horizontal spillover effects, Gorg and Greenaway (2004) challenge 
the results of the 14 which are do not use panel data, because  such studies are unable to deal with problems of 
reverse causality. Haskel, Pereira and Slaughter (2002) and Griffith, Redding and Simpson (2003) find small but 
significant effects for the UK, while  Keller and Yeaple (2003) find large, significant ones for the US.  Javorcik and 
Spatareanu (2003) find evidence for horizontal spillovers in Romania. 
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explain why there is more evidence for horizontal spillovers in developed than in developing 
economies. Glass and Saggi (1998) find that the greater the technology gap between local and 
foreign firms, the lower the quality of technology transferred and the lower the potential for 
spillovers. Kokko et al. (1996) find that in Uruguay there were productivity spillovers to 
domestic firms with moderate technology gaps but not where the gap was large. Borensztein et al. 
(1998) and Lipsey (2000) emphasize the need to improve educational capacity in the host 
economy as a means of strengthening absorptive capacity to incorporate positive spillovers. 
Kinoshita (2001) finds that in the Czech Republic it is only domestic firms that undertake their 
own R&D that enjoy horizontal FDI spillovers.  Further, distinguishing between ‘the two faces 
of R&D’ analyzed by Cohen and Levinthal (1989), Kinoshita finds that R&D performing 
domestic Czech firms benefit not only from innovations produced by that R&D, but also by 
being better able to learn and absorb knowledge from the outside.  This learning effect is several 
times larger than the own-innovation effect.    
Todo and Miyamoto (2006) observe that the extent of horizontal FDI spillovers to 
domestic firms also depends on the level of R&D undertaken in the host country by foreign firms.  
The employees of foreign affiliates that perform local R&D are likely to learn more than those in 
foreign firms that do not, and this knowledge can diffuse to local firms through job turnover, 
work-related discussions and so on.  They find that domestic Indonesian firms in 1994-97 
received positive spillovers only from R&D performing foreign firms, but none from non-R&D 
performing foreign firms.   Taken together, the Kinoshita and Todo and Miyamoto studies 
suggest that domestic ‘in-country’ R&D may be important both for foreign affiliates to generate 
spillovers and also for domestic firms to absorb such spillovers. 
In contrast to the case of horizontal spillovers, foreign firms are likely to be less 
concerned about or may have a positive incentive to transfer knowledge to their local suppliers 
or customers through vertical linkages. As with OEM type supplier-customer relationships, these 
vertical or inter-industry knowledge flows, can take place through direct knowledge transfer, for 
example through training programs, technical support and collaboration on production and 
design issues, indirectly through movement of workers between customers and suppliers or 
simply through higher standards for product quality and on-time delivery, that provide an 
incentive to domestic suppliers to upgrade their technology.   (Local suppliers may also reap the 
benefits of economies of scale because of increased demand for intermediate products from new 
multinational customers, although this is not a knowledge transfer in the strict sense).   
Blalock and Gertler (2004) find strong support for vertical technology transfers from 
MNC customers to local suppliers in Indonesia, as does Javorcik (2004) in Lithuania. Saggi 
(2002) finds that Mexican maquiladoras which began as producers of labor-intensive products 
later adopted more sophisticated production techniques from their US customers.  The size of the 
effects is generally meaningful.  Javorcik (2004) finds that a one-standard deviation increase in 
foreign presence in the purchasing sector of the economy in Lithuania is associated with a 15 
percent rise in output of local firms in supplying sectors.  However, as noted in the earlier 
discussion of OEM type contracts, the potential for vertical transfers is conditional to some 
extent on domestic firms already having sufficient technological capabilities to meet demanding 
quality, cost and delivery requirements and be chosen as suppliers for MNC affiliates in the first 
place, as well as to be capable of technological learning through vertical spillovers once they are 
chosen.  Blalock and Gertler (2004) find, for example, that it is domestic Indonesian firms with 
high levels of human capital that are the prime beneficiaries of vertical knowledge transfers.     18
III  R&D in East Asia 
Total world spending on R&D amounted to $830 billion in PPP terms in 2002
18 of which 
some 78 percent was performed by developed countries, much higher than their 59 percent share 
in world GDP (in PPP terms).  That proportion has fallen over the last decade, however, as 
developing or emerging economies raised their share from 13 percent in 1992 to 22 percent in 
2002.  East Asia has been at the heart of the rise in developing country R&D, contributing almost 
three quarters of the increase and quintupling over the decade (in nominal terms) to reach $112 
billion in 2002 or 13.5 percent of the world total.  R&D intensity in East Asia – the ratio of R&D 
spending to GDP – rose from 0.7 percent in 1992 to 1.2 percent in 2002.   
As Table 4 indicates, however, East Asian economies differ widely in R&D performance.  
Korea, Singapore and Taiwan (China) now devote 2.2-2.5 percent of GDP to R&D spending, 
comparable to levels in the US and the upper end of the scale among developed economies.  On 
the other hand R&D spending in economies such as Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand is only 
0.1-0.2 percent of GDP, among the 
lowest of all economies for which we 
have data.  In between these two 
extremes is China, where R&D 
spending risen at 20 percent a year 
over the last decade to reach 1.4 
percent of GDP by 2004, or $109 
billion in PPP terms.
19  R&D spending 
in Malaysia also accelerated after the 
mid 1990s, reaching 0.7 percent of 
GDP by 2002.   
In East Asia, as elsewhere, 
richer countries like Korea tend to 
have much higher R&D intensities 
than poorer ones like Indonesia.   
Exhibit 7 shows a scatter plot of panel 
data for R&D intensity and per capita 
GDP for a sample of developed and 
developing economies between the 
mid 1970s and the early to mid 2000s.  
R&D intensity not only increases with 
per capita GDP but does so at an 
                                                 
18 UNESCO (2005, 2006).  There is R&D data available for numbers of economies through 2004 or even 2005.  But 
2002 seems to be the most recent year for which there is comprehensive data for the world as a whole.    
19 It is worth noting that the absolute value of China’s R&D in PPP (purchasing power parity) terms is particularly 
affected by the unusually large disparity between its PPP exchange rate (as calculated by the World Bank and other 
researchers) and its market exchange rate.  Thus China’s R&D expenditures in 2004 at market exchange rates were, 
according to data from UNESCO (2006), $23.8 billion, or only 21 percent of the PPP figure.  By comparison 
Korea’s R&D spending in 2003 was $22.8 billion in PPP terms and $16 billion at market exchange rates, or 70 
percent of the PPP figure.  In Malaysia R&D at market rates was 42 percent of R&D in PPP terms.  Note, however, 
that while this issue is relevant for measuring absolute levels of R&D, it does not affect R&D intensity (the ratio of 
R&D to GDP), since both the numerator and denominator of that ratio use the same conversion rate. 
Table 4.  Research and Development Expenditures 
  R&D Spending 2002 R&D as % GDP* 
  US$ Bill.  
(PPP) 
% of  
World  1992 2002 
East Asia  111.7  13.5  0.7  1.2 
  NIEs.  36.4  4.4  1.6  2.2 
     Hong Kong  1.1  0.1  0.3 (b)  0.6 
     Korea  20.8  2.5  1.9  2.5 
     Singapore  2.2  0.3  1.2  2.2 
     Taiwan, China  12.2  1.5  1.8  2.3 
  South East Asia  3.3  0.4  0.1  0.2 
     Indonesia  0.3  0.0  0.1 (c) 0.1  (a) 
     Malaysia  1.5  0.2  0.4  0.7 
     Philippines  0.4  0.0  0.2  0.1 
     Thailand  1.1  0.1  0.2  0.2 
  China  72.0  8.7  0.8  1.2 
         
World 829.9  100.0  1.7  1.7 
Developed   645.8  77.8  2.3  2.3 
     Japan  106.4  12.8  2.9  3.1 
     USA  275.1  33.1  2.6  2.6 
Developing   184.1  22.1  0.6  0.9 
  Latin America  21.7  2.6  0.5  0.6 
  Emerg. Europe  30.3  3.7  1.0  1.2 
Source: UNESCO (2004, 2006). (a) 2001 ( b) 1995 (c) 1994. 
*Regional data are sum of R&D divided by sum of PPP GDP.   19
accelerating pace.  As Exhibit 7 also indicates, the trajectories of R&D intensity in several East 
Asian economies show persistent deviations from the levels suggested by per capita GDP alone.  
R&D intensity in Korea, China and Taiwan (China) has run at levels twice those suggested by 
income.  On the other hand R&D intensity in Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand has 
systematically undershot the estimated average relationship over a long period (both before and 
after the financial crisis of the late 1990s).   
Research at the World Bank by Lederman and Maloney (2003) – one of only a few 
studies to look at R&D in developing countries – finds that policies and institutions play an 
important role in explaining these systematic deviations (while structural differences such the 
size of the economy, the size of the labor force and the relative abundance of natural resources 
do not).  In common with other types of 
investment, R&D intensity declines with 
higher real interest rates and greater 
macroeconomic volatility.  It increases with 
greater financial depth and stronger 
intellectual property rights, as well as with 
subjective measures of the quality of 
research institutions such as universities and 
public research centers, and the quality of 
collaboration between these institutions and 
the private sector.  The last section of this 
paper reviews how East Asian economies 
rank on these economic and institutional 
correlates of R&D intensity and innovation, 
finding marked differences between high and 
low R&D performers.
20 
Are these large differences in R&D 
performance significant for economic 
performance?  Is formal R&D important 
only for a few advanced economies like 
Korea, while most developing countries need only focus on absorbing advanced knowledge from 
abroad, for example through openness to trade and foreign investment?  The study by Lederman 
and Maloney (2003) also estimates the impact of R&D intensity on total factor productivity 
growth for a sample of both developed and developing economies.  They find that a one 
percentage point increase in R&D intensity is associated with a 0.78 percent rise in TFP growth 
– in effect a 78 percent social rate of return on R&D investment.
21  Earlier studies for the United 
States and other OECD countries also find high social rates of return on R&D.
22  Compared to 
                                                 
20 Jaumotte and Pain (2005a) also provide an extensive analysis of the determinants of business sector R&D in the 
OECD countries.  Among the more important influences on business R&D are economic framework variables such 
as the user cost of capital, corporate profits, financial development, international trade openness and product market 
restrictions (lack of competition).  Among significant national innovation system variables are government subsidies 
for business R&D (although only in some conditions), the level of non-business R&D (largely in universities and 
non-profit bodies), business-academic linkages and a lagged term for the number of scientists and engineers. 
21 The term social here indicates that the returns measured include not only private returns to the firm making the 
R&D investment, but also the benefits for others generated by R&D spillovers or externalities. 
22  For example Griliches (1992, 1995) and Jones and Williams (1998). 
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the prevailing costs of capital, these returns imply that actual levels of R&D are only a fraction 
of socially optimal levels.  Interestingly, the study finds that returns to R&D fall substantially 
with the level of per capita income – in other words returns are higher in poor countries than in 
rich ones.  This result is consistent with the intuition that a dollar of R&D should be more 
valuable in poor countries that are far from the technological frontier than in advanced countries 
that must focus on cutting edge innovations that shift the frontier forward.  This is likely to 
especially be the case for R&D expenditures devoted to adapting foreign technologies into forms 
useful in the local environment.   
To summarize, there is some evidence that domestic R&D benefits not only rich 
economies but can also benefit poor ones.  Buttressing a point made earlier, poor economies can 
especially benefit from development expenditures that facilitate absorption of knowledge from 
abroad.  Although potential returns to R&D in poor countries are high, R&D in these economies 
is held back by macroeconomic instability, underdeveloped financial systems, weak intellectual 
property rights and low quality public research institutions.  
 
R&D by Sector of Performance and Funding 
  The business sector in East Asia plays an unusually big role in R&D.
23  Table 5 below 
shows that the median share of business R&D among the main East Asian economies is a little 
over 60 percent, about the same as for developed economies and higher than Latin America  
(around 30 percent) or Emerging Europe (a little over 40 percent).  Exhibit 8 indicates that the 
business share in R&D performed 
generally rises with per capita income.   
However several East Asian economies – 
China, Korea, Malaysia and Philippines - 
have much higher business shares than 
would be suggested by per capita GDP 
alone.
24  Table 5 indicates that for the East 
Asia region over all, the median proportion 
of R&D performed by government – 
around 22 percent – is much higher than 
among developed economies, while the 
proportion performed in higher education 
is much lower.  This may point to a need to 
strengthen the role of research at East 
Asian universities, particularly among the 
newly industrialized economies (NIEs). 
Turning to the financing of R&D, 
the median share of government funding 
for R&D in East Asia is about one third, 
roughly the same as among developed 
                                                 
23 Business R&D here includes domestic private firms, public sector firms and foreign affiliates operating in the 
country.  Government R&D refers to executive branch organizations not engaged in production.  
24 Hong Kong  is an outlier in the other direction: R&D intensity and the proportion of R&D performed by business 
and government are low for its level of per capita income, with the bulk of R&D occurring in higher education.   
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R&D Performed by Business Sector in 
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economies.  The proportion of R&D funded by the business sector also tends to be quite close to 
the proportion it performs. Two exceptions are Malaysia and Singapore, where the proportion of 
R&D performed by business is significantly higher than the proportion it finances, indicating 
significant levels of government funding for R&D performed in the business sector.  (Table 5 
does not encompass tax incentives for business R&D, another widely used policy instrument). 
  Does one type of R&D contribute more to growth than another?  Most of the evidence 
relates to developed economies, but it is informative.  Guellec and Pottelsberge de la Potterie 
(2004) look at the long term impact of business sector R&D, public R&D (defined to include 
R&D performed by universities) and R&D performed in the outside world on total factor 
productivity growth in 16 OECD economies. (R&D in the outside world is introduced to capture 
the effect of international technology spillovers and transfers).  Over the period 1980-98 they 
find the elasticity of productivity with respect to the stocks of business and public R&D to be 
broadly the same  Crucially for developing countries, the stock of foreign R&D appears to have 
an impact 2-3 times as large as domestic business or public R&D, underlining the importance of 
openness to and capacity to absorb international knowledge.  
 
  What conditions might affect the impact of each type of R&D has on growth?  A key 
finding by Guellec and Pottelsberge de la Potterie is that a higher current flow of business R&D 
increases the economy’s ability to absorb benefits from the accumulated stocks of all types of 
R&D, business, public and foreign.  In other words, higher current business R&D by domestic 
firms not only increases their ability to absorb the results of past and present R&D by other 
domestic firms, it also enhance firms’ ability to access knowledge created by the public sector 
and – crucially for developing countries – to access foreign knowledge. Another interesting 
finding is that foreign R&D appears to benefit small economies more than large ones. 
Table 5. R&D by Sector of Performance and Funding * 
  Sector of Performance  Sector of Funding 
  Business Govt. Higher 
Educ. 
Business Govt. Higher 
Educ. 
East Asia  62.2  21.7  14.4  54.3  35.2  2.3 
  NIEs  63.0 11.7  18.8  58.7 35.9  1.7 
  Hong Kong  33.2  3.1  63.6  35.3  62.8  0.2 
  Korea  76.1  12.6  10.1  74.0  23.9  1.7 
  Singapore  63.8  10.9  25.4  54.3  36.6  2.3 
  Taiwan, China  62.2  24.8  12.3  63.1  35.2  0.0 
 S.E. Asia  51.3  22.1  15.7  46.6  35.4  6.2 
  Indonesia  14.3  81.1  4.6  14.7  84.5  0.2 
  Malaysia  65.3  20.3  14.4  51.5  32.1  4.9 
  Philippines  58.6  21.7  17.0  59.7  24.6  7.5 
  Thailand  43.9  22.5  31.0  41.8  38.6  15.1 
  China  62.4 27.1  10.5  60.1 29.9  .. 
Developed  (21)  62.9 13.3  27.0  49.2 33.6  2.1 
  Japan  75.0  9.3  13.7  74.5  17.7  6.3 
  USA  70.1  12.2  13.6 63.7  31.0  .. 
 Latin Amer. (11)  29.0  27.2 32.7  32.9  37.3 27.4 
 Emerg.Europe (9)  42.7  29.8  20.1  38.3  54.2  0.5 
Source: UNESCO Science & Technology Statistics May 2006. 
* For 2002-05, latest available year.  Medians for regions and sub-regions.   22
IV  Advancing the Global Frontier:  Patenting in East Asia 
  Just as R&D expenditure provides a partial measure of the resources devoted to 
innovation, so patents and patent citations provide a valuable though partial view of an 
economy’s innovation outputs.  The view is partial because patents – at least in theory - focus 
only on those innovations that advance the frontier of global knowledge.  They give an inventor 
a temporary legal monopoly over the exploitation of the invention in question, being a device to 
address some of the problems deriving from the non-excludability or non-appropriability 
characteristics of knowledge.  To receive this temporary monopoly (in itself a costly economic 
distortion), an invention must typically satisfy requirements of novelty and non-obviousness, 
which require innovations to make a substantial advance over existing knowledge.
25   
Most innovation in developing countries however involves adoption and adaptation of 
existing knowledge, mostly derived from abroad, a topic studied in Section II above.   
Nevertheless, patentable innovations are of growing importance in East Asia, where several 
advanced economies now patent at around the same rate as advanced economies.  This section 
looks at patenting in East Asia, using (in common with many studies in this area) patents granted 
by the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).
26   It then considers factors determining 
patenting, the technology areas in which East Asian patenting is concentrated, and the quality of 
patenting in the region.  Finally, we use patent citations to study flows of knowledge within East 
Asia and between East Asia and the rest of the world.   
 
Patenting in East Asia  
The number of patents granted to East Asian economies averaged some 12108 per year in 
2000-04, more than five times the number a decade earlier, in 1990-04.  (Table 6). Over the same 
period the number of patents registered by selected Latin American countries increased from 173 
to 368.  Table 6 also shows patents relative to population (patents per 100,000 people).  In the 
early 1990s the number of patents per 100,000 people in East Asia – 0.14 – was 2-3 times levels 
in Latin America and Emerging Europe.  By 2000-04, East Asian patents per capita had risen to 
0.72, some 6-9 times levels in the other two regions.  The vast majority of these patents are 
                                                 
25  Note the the OECD’s definition of innovation in Footnote 2 above.  Scotchmer (2004) provides a non-technical 
primer of intellectual property law.  Issues and pitfalls in the use of patents as innovation indicators are discussed in 
Hall et al (2001), Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002) and Jaffe and Lerner (2004).  Firms may also make a strategic choice 
to protect inventions by other means, for example secrecy, lead times, first mover advantages like moving down the 
learning curve, and provision of sales and manufacturing services that complement the innovation. Levin et al 
(1987) and Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2002) document the importance for US firms of these other methods.  
26 This discussion draws on the NBER Patent Citation Database (http://www.nber.org/patent/, described in Hall, 
Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 2001), updated through 2002 by Bronwyn Hall 
(http://emlab.berkely.edu/users/bhhall/index.html) and through 2004 by Albert Hu.  (Hu, 2006).  The use of US 
patents may be justified by the fact that creators of commercially valuable inventions have a strong incentive to take 
out a patent in the US,, given its position as the largest market in the world. Close to 50 percent of patents granted 
by the USPTO in 2000-04 were to foreigners.  Nevertheless, there is a large home bias in patenting (inventors are 
more likely to patent in their home jurisdiction than elsewhere) and inventors in different economies may also face 
different incentives to patent in the US (for example depending on the level of  exports to the US). These factors,  
could introduce biases that need to be adjusted for.  We concentrate on patents and patent citations for seven East 
Asian economies:  China, Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan (China) and Thailand, 
together with two of their largest economic partners, the United States and Japan.     23
generated by the NIEs, Taiwan (China) and Korea in particular, which by 2004 had become the 
4
th and 5
th biggest recipients of USPTO patents in the world, after the US, Japan and Germany. 
As with R&D, there is also a wide variation in patenting across East Asia.  Taiwan 
(China) now generates some 30 patents per 100,000 people, about as many as Japan and the 
United States, the best performers among the developed economies.  Korea, Hong Kong and 
Singapore generate around 8-10 patents per capita per year, similar to the performance of the 
developed OECD countries in the mid 1980s, although only about half the average OECD level 
today.  Further down the scale, Malaysia generates 0.2-0.3 patents per capita, similar to Korea in 
the mid 1980s.  Finally, countries such as China, Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand bring up 
the rear with patents per capita in the 0.01-0.07 range, although patenting in China is rising very 
rapidly from a low base.
27   
Exhibits 9 and 10 show a scatter diagram of patents per capita versus per capita income 
(in PPP terms), using panel data for 1977-2004.  (The sample is shown in two exhibits, to permit 
display of greater detail at different scales).  As with R&D intensity, patents per capita tend to 
rise much more than proportionately to per capita income – 7-8 times more in this case.  Thus 
patents per capita in Singapore are 30 times those in Malaysia, even though Singapore’s per 
capita income (in PPP terms) is only about 3 times higher than Malaysia’s. The exhibits pick out 
the trajectories of patents and income for individual countries over time.  Exhibit 3 shows that 
                                                 
27 Hu and Jefferson (2005)  suggest several reasons for the acceleration in Chinese patenting: (i) the acceleration in 
China’s R&D spending noted above; (ii) strengthening of China’s Patent Law in 1992 and 2000; (iii) the vast influx 
of foreign direct investment to China, which has greatly increased the market value of intellectual property for both 
foreign and domestic firms; (iv) the rapid relative growth of ‘complex industries’ like electronics and machinery, 
which involve many separately patentable sub-products and processes; (v) the acceleration of enterprise reform after 
the mid 1990s, which has greatly strengthened private property rights vis-à-vis state owned enterprises. 
Table 6.  USPTO Patents Granted * 
  Number of Patents Patents per 100000 People 
  1990-04 2000-04 1990-04  2000-04  %  Change 
East Asia (9)  2239  12108  0.14  0.72  17.6 
  NIEs  2159  11601  2.93  14.74  17.5 
  Hong Kong  184  616  3.15  9.32  11.4 
  Korea  633  4009  1.44  8.67  19.7 
  Singapore  36  382  1.09  9.87  24.6 
  Taiwan, China  1307  6593  6.30  30.17  17.0 
 S.E. Asia  31  140  0.01  0.04  15.3 
  Indonesia  6  15  0.00  0.01  8.8 
  Malaysia  13  64  0.07  0.28  15.3 
  Philippines  6  18  0.01  0.02  10.4 
  Thailand  6  43  0.01  0.07  20.9 
  China  48  368 0.00 0.03  22.9 
World  107361  182523 1.98 2.95  4.1 
Developed (21)  104170  168017  12.88  19.58  4.3 
  Japan  22647  35687  18.23  28.54  4.6 
  USA  59024  97104  23.00  33.56  3.9 
Developing         
 Latin Amer. (11)  173  368  0.04  0.08  6.3 
 Emerg.Europe (9)  205  348  0.07  0.12  5.6 
Source: US Patent and Trademark Office. * Annual averages. 
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East Asian NIEs such as Korea and Singapore have generated patents per capita much higher 
than predicted by their income levels alone, in much the same way as their R&D.  Interestingly, 
in recent years patenting in Hong Kong has also exceeded predicted levels, even though its R&D 
is much lower than predicted.  Exhibit 10 shows that Malaysia and China have generally 
innovated at around the levels predicted by income, although China’s patenting has accelerated 
to levels higher than predicted by income in recent years.  Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand, 
on the other hand, have performed below the predicted level, in line with their R&D 
underperformance. 
 
What factors determine the flow of innovation outputs in an economy?  The large 
empirical literature estimating “knowledge production functions” in developed economies 
typically finds a strongly significant relationship between innovation inputs like R&D 
expenditure and innovation outputs such as patent counts.
28   Bottazi and Peri (2005) study the 
short and long run dynamics of knowledge production in OECD countries by relating the flow of 
patents to domestic R&D flows and to the existing stocks of domestic and international 
knowledge (measured respectively by the stocks of patents accumulated in the country and in the 
rest of the OECD).  The idea is that innovation depends not only on the current resources 
devoted to R&D in the country but also on knowledge spillovers from the entire stock of earlier 
knowledge accumulated in the world as a whole.  Bottazi and Peri find long run elasticities of 
patenting on R&D and the stock of foreign knowledge of around 0.8 and 0.6 respectively.  Thus, 
                                                 
28 For example see Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984, 1986), Griliches (1990), Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen 
(1995),  Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002). 
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Source: USPTO and World Bank Development Indicators.   25
in addition to domestic R&D, openness to foreign knowledge plays a big part in domestic 
innovation, a point that was also made in Section II above.  
Recent World Bank research by Bosch, Lederman and Maloney (2005) appears to be a 
rare study that looks at the relationship between patenting and R&D worldwide, including 
developing economies.  The study finds a significant relationship between patenting and R&D at 
the global level, although the estimated elasticity of patenting with respect to R&D for OECD 
economies (around 1) is substantially higher than among developing economies.  The lower 
productivity of R&D spending in developing economies appears to be due to weaknesses in their 
national innovation systems.  In particular the study finds that R&D productivity has a 
significant positive relationship with years of education, the quality of academic institutions, the 
quality of intellectual property rights and the level of collaboration between research institutions 
and the private sector, all factors which on average are substantially lower among developing 
than OECD economies.  Among these factors, years of education and intellectual property rights 
appear to have the most significant impact on R&D efficiency.   
 
In which technologies is East Asia innovating?   
Is patenting in East Asia broadly diversified or concentrated in particular sectors?  The 
USPTO classifies patents into one of around 480 technology classes.  Exhibit 11 shows adjusted 
Herfindahl indexes of concentration across these technology classes for several major Pacific 
Rim economies.  An index level of 1 means concentration in just one technology, while (in this 
case) an index of around 0.002 would mean equal distribution across all classes.  The exhibit 
suggests that patenting in East Asian economies is considerably less diversified than in mature 
developed economies like Japan and the US.  
Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1999) distill the lengthy list of USPTO patent classes into 6 broad 
groups:  chemicals, computers and communications, drugs and medical, electrical and electronic, 
mechanical and all other.   A major area of concentration in East Asia is electrical and electronics.  
The median share of patenting in this technology area for seven East Asian economies in 2002-
04 is 38 percent, ranging from a low of 25 percent in Hong Kong to 45-50 percent in Taiwan 
(China) and Singapore.  The second most important area of concentration is computers and 
communications, with a median East Asian share of 15 percent, ranging from a low of 12 percent 
for China and Malaysia to 25-30 percent for Korea and Singapore. The share of East Asian 
patenting in these two areas has generally risen since the early 1990s.   
In part the high concentration of East Asian patenting in these sectors just reflects the 
high technological opportunity and propensity to patent in these sectors worldwide.  But East 
Asian patenting in electrical and electronics (in particular) is also high relative to the world 
average share of patenting in this sector -  in other words East Asian Revealed Comparative 
Advantage (RCA) indexes in this sector are generally substantially greater than one, reflecting 
world class levels of sophistication in specific areas of specialization, for example Korea in 
DRAM technology and LCD manufacture, or Taiwan (China) in the wafer foundry industry, 
testing and packaging services.  By comparison most East Asian economies show a distinct 
revealed comparative disadvantage in the drugs and medical sector.  (Exhibit 12). 
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How Good is East Asian Patenting? 
Although the volume of patenting in economies such as Korea and Taiwan (China) 
equals or exceeds that in most developed economies, is the same also true of the quality of their 
innovations?  The technological or economic value of patents can vary enormously.  In fact the 
distribution of patent values is highly skewed.  A survey of the realized economic value of 
patents in Germany and the US, for example, found that the top 10 percent of patents accounted 
for over 80 percent of economic value.  (Scherer and Harhoff, 2000).  Thus a simple count of 
patents may not provide an adequate summary of the quality of the underlying innovations.   
A particularly useful feature of patents is that they contain citations to the previous 
patents and scientific literature which define the “prior art” to which the patent is making an 
original contribution.  Trajtenberg et al (1997) suggest measuring the quality of patents with 
indexes of patent “generality” and “originality” based on patent citations.  A patent is said to 
have greater generality and impact if it is cited more often by a wider range of technology classes.  
A patent is said to be more basic or original if it cites a wide range of patent technology classes.  
US patents generally have higher generality and originality indexes across all technology 
fields compared to Japan and other East Asian economies.
 29   Exhibits 13 and 14 show.that   
Japanese patents generally achieve quality ratings that are 80 to 90 percent or more of US quality 
ratings.  Korea, in particular, is close to Japan in most technology areas, even matching or 
exceeding it in some.  Taiwan (China) tends to achieve somewhat lower generality and 
originality scores, but still scores 70-80 percent of US levels. 
                                                 
29  Some East Asian economies have few if any patents in some technology fields, resulting in few citations with 
which to compute generality or originality indexes.  The discussion therefore focuses on Korea and Taiwan (China), 

































Source:  USPTO and Hu (2006).
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Knowledge Flows to, from and within East Asia:   Patent Citations 
  Section II noted that knowledge flows from abroad play a crucial role in facilitating 
domestic R&D and innovation. In that discussion the evidence for knowledge flows was adduced 
indirectly, by looking at correlations between activities that are expected to facilitate knowledge 
flows – for example, foreign trade, FDI or technology licenses - and economic productivity. 
Section III cited econometric evidence on the spillover benefits for productivity growth in an 
individual economy from R&D in foreign countries. This section looks at evidence from patent 
citations, which provide a unique and more direct window onto flows of knowledge between 
inventors, firms and economies.
30   
Exhibit 15 shows the share of various foreign economies in patent citations made by 
seven East Asian economies (as a group).  The United States remains by far the largest source of 
citations for East Asian innovators, providing close to 60 percent, this proportion having risen 
slightly between 1992-94 and 2002-04.  Japan is the second largest source, contributing close to 
20 percent.  (Korea is an interesting exception to this general pattern:  its reliance on US citations 
is substantially lower than other East Asian economies – around 45 percent – while its reliance 
on Japan is higher, around 33 percent).  The share of other ‘G5’economies, defined here as 
comprising Canada, France, Germany, Italy and the U.K., is lower, less than 10 percent, having 
fallen over the last decade.  Perhaps most interesting, the share of citations made by East Asian 
economies to other East Asian economies, while still low, is rising fast, picking up from 1.7 
percent of citations in 1992-94 to 5.9 percent in 2002-04.  Most of these intra-East Asian patent 
citations are to patents held by Korea and Taiwan (China), the two largest innovators in the 
                                                 
30 The discussion draws on data from the NBER Patent Citations Database.  See Footnote 30 for further details. 
Exhibit 13 
Patent Originality Index 2000-04














Korea Taiwan (China) Japan
 
Source: USPTO and Hu (2006) 
Exhibit 14 
Patent Generality Index 2000-04

















region.  Exhibit 15 also indicates that the share of citations by inventors in an East Asian 
economy to patents granted to other inventors in the same economy (referred to as “compatriot 
citations”) is also rising, reaching 3.3 percent on average in 2002-04.   
 
Exhibit 16 provides a closer look at the rise of intra-regional and compatriot knowledge 
flows for individual East Asian economies.  The share of citations to other East Asian economies 
(typically to Korean and Taiwan (China) patents) is highest – around 7-8 percent - in China, 
Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore.  The share of ‘own’ or ‘compatriot’ patents is highest in 
Korea (around 6 percent) and Taiwan (China), where it is already over 10 percent. 
  Such raw citation shares provide useful information on the gross flows of knowledge 
between economies, but say little about the intensity of knowledge relationships.  It is not 
surprising that East Asian economies should have large shares of citations to US patents, simply 
because the US is by far the largest generator of patents worldwide, and thus of potential 
citations.  Even Japan, which produces almost as many patents per capita as the US, still has over 
40 percent of its citations to the US.  Researchers have therefore developed a citation frequency 
measure of how intensively patents in one country cite patents from another after controlling for 
the size of the potential pool of citations between the two.
31  In simple terms, it is the number of 
citations from country A to country B divided by the product of the potential number of citing 
patents in country A and potential number of citable patents in country B. 
Exhibit 17 shows patent citation frequencies between the US, Japan, Korea and Taiwan 
(China) in the electrical and electronics technology field.  There are several striking features.  
Each of these four economies cites compatriot patents from the same economy much more 
                                                 
31 For further detail see Jaffe and Trajtenberg (2002) and Hu (2006).  
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Source: USPTO and Hu (2006).   29
intensively than patents in the rest of the 
world.  Thus, after controlling for the fact 
that the potential pool of citable electrical 
and electronics patents in Korea is much 
smaller than the potential pool in the US, 
Korean patents cite other Korean patents 
almost 5 times as intensively as they do US 
patents.  This finding is consistent with 
earlier findings that there is a significant 
degree of geographical localization in 
knowledge spillovers.   Thus Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993) found 
that even within the United States the 
frequency of citation from a patent in one 
American state to other patents from the 
same state is higher than from other states, 
while Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1998) 
confirmed that citation frequencies within 
OECD economies are much higher than 
the frequency of citation from one OECD 
economy to another.   
The main reason for geographical 
localization of knowledge spillovers is the 
tacitness of knowledge.  Many types of 
information, for example the price of a 
commodity, can be easily codified and cheaply 
transmitted by electronic means.  However 
complex scientific and technical knowledge 
often cannot be easily codified and can only be 
fully communicated if accompanied by face to 
face interaction.  Tacitness and geographical 
localization help explain the economic 
usefulness of cities and industrial clusters, 
which facilitate face to face interactions and 
knowledge spillovers.  At the national level 
these findings provide more evidence for the 
value of domestic R&D and innovation efforts, 
since they suggest that it is easier for local residents to absorb the knowledge spillovers from 
local innovations than it is from foreign ones.   Among other important research results, Jaffe, 
Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993) found that localization within US states fades away over time, 
while Audretsch and Feldman (1996) found that geographical clustering is greatest in industries 
with high R&D intensity and high employment of skilled labor, as well as in industries at an 
early stage of their life cycle, when more of the knowledge about that industry is still in the 
heads of skilled workers and less of it has been codified in manuals and protocols. 
Exhibit 17 above also provides evidence for the high intensity of intra-East Asian cross-
border knowledge flows.  The citation frequency from Korea to both Taiwan (China) and Japan 
Table 7.  Citation Frequencies:   
Estimated Country-Pair Fixed Effects * 
  Cited Economies 
 USA  Japan  Korea 
Taiwan  
(China) 
Citing Economies        
USA 1.00  0.57  0.38  0.29 
Japan 0.46  0.80  0.44  0.23 
Korea 0.46  0.70  1.16  0.69 
Taiwan (China)  0.26  0.25  0.71  0.83 
China 0.36  0.31  0.44  0.41 
Hong Kong  0.45  0.41  0.42  0.40 
Malaysia 0.44  0.32  0.53  0.57 
Singapore 0.95  0.60  0.93  1.63 
Thailand 0.66  0.33  0.27  0.10 
Source: Hu (2006). * Normalized by “US citing US”=1 
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Source: USPTO and Hu (2006).   30
patents is more than twice as high as citation frequency for US patents.  Reciprocating, Taiwan 
(China)’s citation frequency to Korea is also near three times its frequency with Japan and the 
US, while Japan’s frequency to Korea is almost as high as its citation frequency to US patents.  
These trends again confirm the growing regional dimension in East Asian knowledge flows. 
A more rigorous analysis of citation frequency uses the double exponential model of 
knowledge diffusion introduced by Caballero and Jaffe (1993).  Hu (2006) estimates this model 
for East Asian economies to derive more refined estimates of citation frequencies between 
countries after taking into account the ‘technological proximity’ between pairs of economies
32, 
lags between citing and cited patents, obsolescence and fixed effects for different technology 
classes. Table 7 shows these estimates normalized relative to the citation frequency of US 
patents citing other US patents, which is set equal to one.  The results for Korea, Taiwan (China) 
Japan and the US are similar to those for ‘raw’ citation frequencies discussed above. Singapore 
shows an exceptionally high citation frequency to Taiwan (China), and also to Korea, which 
significantly exceed or equal (also high) citation frequencies to Japan and the US.  China and 
Malaysia’s citation frequencies to Korea and Taiwan (China) also exceed those to Japan and the 
US.  (An Appendix to this paper provides a more detailed outline of the estimated knowledge 
diffusion model). 
 
V  Policy Considerations  
  This section discusses policies and institutions that may help foster domestic innovation 
as well as absorption of knowledge from abroad.  It briefly reviews differences in the quality of 
these policies and institutions across East Asian economies.     
Business Environment for Innovation   
If R&D and other innovation activities undertaken by firms are best viewed as a form of 
capital investment, it is not surprising that they are affected by many of the same factors as 
overall business investment.   
Macroeconomic stability.  Persistent macroeconomic instability is among the factors commonly 
found among the most harmful to private investment, and it is also found to have a clear adverse 
impact on R&D intensity.  Lederman and Maloney (2003) find that macroeconomic volatility as 
measured by the standard deviation of per capita GDP growth has a very significant negative 
relation with R&D intensity.  For OECD countries, Jaumotte and Pain (2005a) find that low and 
stable inflation has a positive influence on the rate of growth of R&D stocks.  
Cost of capital and financial development.  The cost of capital, the availability of credit and the 
level of development of the financial system are also important for innovation.  Jaumotte and 
Pain (2005a) find that the user cost of capital has a significant negative relation with the growth 
of R&D stocks in OECD countries, while Lederman and Maloney (2003)obtain a similar result 
for a real interest rate measure with respect to R&D intensity in a set of both developed and 
developing countries.  The quantity of credit and financial sector depth are also important 
influences on innovation.  A well developed financial sector and capital market help meet the 
widely different financing needs of more or less risky short term and long term innovation 
                                                 
32 Technological proximity is defined as the correlation between the technology vectors of two economies, each  
vector being defined as the shares of total patents taken out by the economy in 428 different technology classes.   31
projects undertaken by firms.  As noted, Aryaggari et al (2006) find availability of finance from 
sources external to the firm to have a strong association with broader measures of firm 
innovation in developing countries.  Jaumotte and Pain arrive at similar conclusions for growth 
in R&D stocks in OECD countries with respect to corporate profits (firm internal finance), credit 
to the private sector from financial institutions and stock market capitalization.  Table 8 uses 
credit to the private sector as a rough indicator of financial sector development, indicating 
significantly lower financial depth in various of the middle income South East Asian economies 
than in the NIEs.   





































East Asia (9)  102  40  7.6 1375 4.5 4.1  4.3  878
    NIEs  125  22  9.2  3165  5.2  4.7  5.1  1475 
      Hong Kong  153  11  9.5  1564  4.9  4.1  5.0  1640 
      Korea  98  22  10.5  3187  5.1  4.8  4.5  1240 
      Singapore  115  6  8.1  4745  5.5  5.0  6.1  1284 
      Taiwan, China  135  48  8.5  ..  5.2  4.9  4.9  1735 
   SE Asia  75  66  6.6  210  4.1  3.6  3.8  398 
      Indonesia  20  151  4.7  207  3.9  3.4  3.2  127 
      Malaysia  141  30  7.9  299  5.0  4.7  5.1  642 
      Philippines  38  48  7.6  48  3.3  2.7  2.8  322 
      Thailand  102  33  6.1  287  4.0  3.6  4.1  499 
   China  118  48  5.7  663  3.8  3.9  3.2  413 
High Income (21)  112 20  9.5  3616  5.1  4.4  5.5 1392 
       Japan  100  31  9.7  5287  5.6  4.6  5.3  1151 
       USA  249  5  12.3  4484  6.4  5.7  6.4  1175 
Latin America (11)  36  67  6.7  300  3.5  3.0  3.1  409 
Emerg. Europe (9)  29 30  8.7  1503  4.0  3.1  3.3  850 
(1)Credit to Private Sector as % of GDP. (2) World Bank. Doing Business 2005. (3) Source: Barro and Lee (2000).  
(4) UNESCO (2006). (5) Source: Global Competitiveness Report 2005. Index ranging from 1 (weakest) to 7 (strongest).  
(6) Fixed Line and Mobile subscribers per 1000 population.  All regional data are simple averages. 
 
Aghion, Angeletos, Banerjee and Manova (2005) emphasize that credit availability and 
financial development are particularly important when firms are in a volatile macroeconomic 
environment.  Firms with significant credit constraints will be less able to overcome short term 
liquidity pressures during economic downturns, and so will undertake less long term R&D.   
Long term credit allows firms to look beyond cyclical and liquidity pressures to pursue longer 
term innovation.  Panel data for OECD countries shows that the interaction term between 
financial development and volatility has a significantly positive impact on the ratio of R&D to 
total investment spending.   
Openness.  The earlier discussion of imports as a channel for technology transfer suggests that 
excessively restrictive trade policies can prove a significant barrier to international technology 
transfer.  Preferential trading arrangements that create a bias against trade with R&D rich 
Northern economies will also tend to choke off knowledge transfers and spillovers, which 
(following the results of Schiff, Wang and Olarreaga, 2002) may be especially detrimental to the 
development of R&D intensive industries.  Hoekman, Maskus and Saggi (2005) point out,   32
however, that these arguments for open trade policies are not entirely unconditional.  If 
development of a national industry creates localized knowledge spillovers, there may be a 
rationale for intervention.  This was form of infant-industry argument was one of the 
justifications for import-substitution strategies in many developing countries in the 1950s and 
1960s.  Nevertheless, trade restrictions may not be the most effective way of fostering domestic 
R&D, industrial development or spillovers, since they create new distortions, reward domestic 
firms whether they innovate or not, and have a high cost, not least by restricting international 
knowledge inflows.  More direct policies to subsidize domestic R&D, improve the investment 
climate and strengthen education are likely to prove superior.   
Competition.   As with trade openness, the question whether greater competition in domestic 
product markets serves to foster innovation does not have an entirely simple answer.  A survey 
of OECD countries by Ahn (2002) comes to the agnostic conclusion that “empirical evidence 
does not support the view that market concentration is an independent and significant 
determinant of innovative behavior and performance,” Although other studies (for example 
Nickell, 1996, and Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen, 1999) have pointed to a positive 
correlation. Evidence is much thinner for developing economies, but Ayyagari et al (2006) also 
find a positive relation between several competition indicators and their broad measure of firm 
dynamism in low and middle income economies.   
Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith and Howitt (2005) observe that greater product market 
competition between incumbent firms could have different effects that both discourage and 
promote innovation.    In industries where the existing level of competition is low and firms have 
similar levels of technological capability, more competition may promote innovation by giving 
the innovating firm a competitive advantage.   On the other hand, in industries where there is 
already high product market competition and one firm has a large technological lead over others, 
a further increase in competition may discourage innovation by lagging firms because it reduces 
the rewards for trying to ‘catch-up’.   The study finds strong evidence for such an ‘inverted U 
curve’ in multi-industry panel data for UK firms. Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt and Prantl 
(2006) argue that entry of technologically advanced firms into an industry can also have a similar 
dual-edged effect on innovation, tending to stimulate innovation when incumbent firms are close 
to the global technology frontier, but discouraging it when they are technological laggards.   
Given the limited empirical evidence, it is probably unwise to draw firm conclusions for 
policy in East Asian or other developing countries.  But a few observations can be hazarded.  
First, increased competition has many potential benefits effort economic performance other than 
the impact on innovation, for example on firm efficiency and overall productivity growth. (Ahn, 
2002).  Conclusions about the role of competition policy need to be based on an assessment of all 
of these effects.  Second, the balance of empirical work cited finds a positive association 
between more competition between incumbent firms and innovation. While the study by Aghion, 
Bloom, Blundell, Griffith and Howitt (2005) reaches more qualified results, it too suggests that 
more competition is favorable for innovation when competition is low to start with – that is, 
when lack of competition is most likely to be of concern to policymakers.   
Turning to new firm entry, the interesting findings by Aghion, Blundell, Griffith, Howitt 
and Prantl (2006) for the U.K. obviously need to be buttressed by more empirical work across a 
wider range of countries (including developing countries).  There are several hypotheses that 
need further empirical testing.  One is that opening up to entry by technologically sophisticated 
competitors may be especially beneficial for innovation by incumbent firms in advanced   33
emerging economies like Korea, Taiwan (China) and Singapore, where many key sectors now 
function close to the global technology frontier.  This might also be the case in fast moving 
middle income economies that aspire to follow in the tracks of the advanced emerging 
economies.  By the same token the study suggests the possibility that opening up to 
technologically sophisticated firms could have a depressing effect on innovation in economies 
and sectors that are far from the global technological frontier.   
However a number of other considerations do need to be kept in mind in drawing policy 
conclusions from these findings.   First, new firm entry could lead to gains in productivity and 
consumer welfare due to replacement of low productivity by high productivity firms and the 
reallocation of resources to more productive uses.  Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2004) 
note that the process of creative destruction – the entry of new firms and the exit of less efficient 
ones –contributes from 20 to 50 percent of total labor productivity growth among firms in 10 
developed and 14 developing economies.  In contrast to Aghion et al, they also find a positive 
relation between the pace of creative destruction (i.e. of net entry) and productivity growth in 
already existing (incumbent) firms.  They suggest that increased contestability of markets by new 
entrants induces incumbent firms to perform more efficiently. Second, new entry by 
technologically sophisticated firms is also likely to facilitate vertical technology transfer to local 
suppliers.  This discussion suggests that even in less developed economies blocking off entry by 
sophisticated foreign firms is unlikely to be the most efficient economy-wide way of promoting 
technological development and productivity growth.  As with trade, more direct fiscal or other 
measures may provide superior instruments to foster domestic R&D and innovation.  We return 
to such instruments later in this section.  
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) regime.  A fifth important factor for innovation is the 
intellectual property rights (IPR) regime, although theoretically the direction of the effect is 
ambiguous.  On the one hand a weak IPR regime hampers firms from appropriating the returns 
from R&D.  However IPRs themselves create an economic distortion by granting a temporary 
monopoly to innovators.  This may make it more difficult for other firms to access knowledge 
they need for their own innovation activities.  IPRs may also dampen innovation if they reduce 
competition in product markets and if less competition tends to reduce innovation.   
Which of these effects prevails is an empirical question.  Table 8 shows that the quality 
of the IP regime is rated as significantly weaker in China and several South East Asian 
economies than in the NIEs.  Lederman and Maloney (2005) find that stronger IPRs have a 
highly significant positive impact on R&D intensity in their sample of developing and developed 
economies, while Bosch, Lederman and Maloney (2005) find that IPR quality has a significant 
positive impact on the productivity of R&D, as measured by patents per dollar of R&D.  For 
OECD countries, Jaumotte and Pain (2005a) however find that IPRs have little discernable 
influence on the growth of R&D stocks, although they do influence the flow of patenting.  They 
suggest that in OECD countries IPRs influence the propensity to patent out of the underlying 
stream of innovations, but not that flow itself.  The lack of influence on OECD R&D may reflect 
the fact that there is much less variation in the quality of IPR regimes across OECD countries 
than in the world as a whole.  The coefficient of variation in OECD countries for IPR regimes 
shown in Table 8 is only one third as large as in the whole sample.   
Recent research suggests that IPR regimes may influence not only indigenous R&D and 
innovation, but also the scope of countries’ interactions with the outside world, which, as this 
paper has stressed, are a primary means of absorbing new knowledge in most developing   34
countries, through trade, FDI, licensing of foreign technologies or other means.  Fink and 
Maskus (2005) note that the potential impact of IPRs on inward technology transfer is also 
theoretically ambiguous:  stronger IPRs will improve incentives for a foreign IPR holder to enter 
the domestic market, but will also increase its market power.  While foreign technologies 
become more available in the domestic market, domestic firms are less able to imitate them.  The 
net effect on the volume of international transactions and on domestic productivity growth is an 
empirical question, the answer to which may differ across countries and sectors.   
Fink and Maskus (2005) also note recent studies that find a significant positive link 
between stronger IPRs and international trade.  Stronger patent rights appear to have the most 
significant influence on the propensity of multinational companies to export in the case of large 
middle income economies, i.e. those which pose a greater threat of imitation and reverse 
engineering.  The evidence on IPRs and foreign direct investment is less conclusive.  However 
there is some evidence that IPRs are a significant consideration for FDI location decisions among 
middle income countries.  Foreign firms may be also be more likely to invest in local production 
and R&D rather than in distribution facilities when there are stronger IPRs.  Finally there is clear 
evidence that stronger IPRs have a significant positive impact on international technology 
licensing (as measured by licensing royalty payments).  Licensing is clearly sensitive to the 
lower contract enforcement costs provided by a stronger IPR regime. 
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) Infrastructure.  Availability of good ICT 
infrastructure is important in fostering innovation, both by facilitating cheap circulation of 
disembodied knowledge across and within national boundaries, as well as by reducing the 
transactions costs of international trade and foreign investment flows.  Rapid advances in ICT 
services in developing countries have been driven in part by the liberalization of telecom markets 
and regulatory reform in recent decades.  Nevertheless there remain wide disparities in ICT 
development across East Asia.  (Table 8).    
Human Capital Development 
Education and other forms of human capital development provide a fundamental 
underpinning for both domestic innovation activity and for the learning capacity of the economy.  
Table 8 shows that South East Asian economies and China possess around 3 years fewer average 
years of schooling than the NIEs.  Exhibit 18 shows that the proportion of adults with higher 
education tends to rise more than proportionately with income. Some countries such as Korea 
have increased higher education even more rapidly, while others have lagged.     
There are also sharp differences in the quality of education.  The four East Asian NIEs 
achieved the highest math and science scores out of 45-46 economies participating in 2003 
TIMMS exercise.
33  On the other hand, the Philippines was in the bottom 5 for both math and 
science, while Indonesia was in, or not too much above, the bottom ten.  Similarly, in the 
OECD’s 2003 Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) for mathematics 
proficiency, Korea and Hong Kong (China) were in the top 5 in a sample of 40, while Thailand 
and Indonesia were in the bottom 5.  There are also wide differences in the extent and quality of 
tertiary and specialized scientific and technical education, as reflected in the numbers of 
researchers per million shown in Table 8.  This measure averages over 3000 in the NIEs, and 
fewer than one tenth as many on average in South East Asian economies. 
                                                 
33 TIMMS is the Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study.     35
 
Government Support for Innovation 
Activity 
So far this section has mostly 
covered broad policy areas like 
maintenance of macroeconomic stability, 
financial sector development and human 
capital development that, while they are 
expected to promote innovation and 
technology transfer, are also expected to 
have other wider economic and social 
benefits.  Now we look at more specific 
policies that aim to foster innovation 
through targeted fiscal incentives or 
regulations.  The theoretical rationale for 
direct public interventions of this type 
derives from the possibility that they might 
help offset market failures associated with 
knowledge, for example non-excludability, 
which make it difficult for private firms to 
appropriate all the returns from their R&D 
investments, leading to less than optimal innovation activities.  Such problems are likely to be 
particularly significant for basic research that provides the early seeds for a variety of 
innovations by many firms, or which help countries better access the global pool of knowledge.  
We look at four types of policies. 
Support for science and university/public sector research.   As Table 5 above indicates, the 
public sector in developed countries provides about one third of R&D funding, on average 0.6-
0.7 percent of GDP, including funding for basic scientific research undertaken by universities or 
public sector research laboratories and institutes.  In East Asia, public funding for R&D reaches 
this level of GDP only in a few advanced economies like Korea, Singapore and Taiwan (China).   
There is a good deal of evidence for the positive effect of R&D funded or performed by 
universities and the public sector on both overall productivity and on business R&D.  As noted 
above, Guellec and Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2004) find the positive impact of university and 
public R&D stocks on productivity growth in OECD countries to be even larger than that of 
business R&D stocks.  Jaumotte and Pain (2005b) also find that non-business R&D spending has 
a significant impact on growth in business R&D stocks in OECD countries, with a couple of 
qualifications. First, the impact of public and university R&D is likely to depend on the quality 
of links between these sectors and the business R&D sector, which uses the results of more basic 
research to develop commercially valuable products.  Second, a greater volume of public sector 
R&D can “crowd out” business R&D by pushing up wages for scientific and technical staff.  The 
latter could be a particular concern in developing countries where such specialized skills are in 
scarce supply.  At least in OECD countries, the overall impact of non-business R&D on business 
R&D remains positive, even after taking crowding-out effects into account. 
Exhibit 18 
Post-Secondary Education and GDP per Capita
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Source: Barro and Lee (2000) and World Bank.   36
As regards evidence for developing countries, Lederman and Maloney (2003) find that 
the perceived quality of research institutions such as universities and public research institutes 
has a significant positive impact on overall R&D intensity in both developed and developing 
countries, as does the perceived quality of the interaction between these institutions and the 
private sector.  Bosch, Lederman and Maloney (2005) find that these two factors also have a 
significant impact on the productivity of R&D in developed and developing countries. Table 8 
above shows that there are significant disparities in the quality of scientific/academic research 
institutions and the quality of university-industry research collaboration, with the NIEs and 
Malaysia scoring significantly higher than other South East economies and China.  In addition, 
policy makers also need to ensure that public research funding is allocated using transparent, 
competitive and merit-based procedures, according to criteria which strike an acceptable balance 
between short term commercial interests and longer term needs.   
Fiscal subsidies and tax incentives for business R&D.  Many countries also devote significant 
fiscal resources to subsidies or tax incentives for business R&D,  Although there is often a sound 
theoretical rationale for such measures, there are also serious informational and incentive 
problems in implementing such policies.  A limited amount of empirical work does not so far 
yield much of a consensus on their effectiveness. 
Among practical difficulties two stand out.  First, governments are unlikely to have any 
special information about which sectors might yield the largest knowledge spillovers from 
innovation, and which therefore merit help.  Government policies to ‘pick winners’ could then 
lead to outcomes that are worse than those resulting from private decisions unconcerned about 
externalities and market failures.  (Pack and Saggi, 2006; Klimenko, 2004).  Noland and Pack 
(2003) conclude that preferential industrial policies in Japan tended to concentrate on declining 
sectors rather than on industries experiencing rapid technological change or increasing returns, 
and had no noticeable impact on national or sectoral rates of total factor productivity growth.  
For Korea they conclude that “the evidence does not support the notion that selective 
intervention had a decisive (or even necessarily a positive) impact on the Korean economy.”  
Rodrik (2004) observes that a modern or “new” industrial policy should no longer aim to “pick 
winners” or sectors, but should instead target key activities that are underprovided because of 
market failures, for example through a generalized tax credit that does not discriminate across 
sectors, or support for adaptation of foreign technologies to local conditions.   
The second difficulty is that fiscal incentives for innovation can easily become a gateway 
for corruption and rent-seeking.  It is thus not clear if the social gains from fiscal incentives 
would offset all the compliance and administrative costs associated with it. 
In a review of the empirical literature, Garcia-Quevado (2004) finds there is not yet much 
consensus on the effectiveness of public R&D subsidies.  Some studies find a significant positive 
impact on business R&D, but that this declines after a point and even becomes negative (so that 
subsidies substitute for private financing that would have been used in the absence of the 
subsidy).  Jaumotte and Pain (2005b) find that R&D subsidies have a slightly negative impact on 
growth in business R&D stocks, evaluated at the mean for their sample of OECD countries.  The 
evidence seems clearer on the effectiveness of R&D tax credits.  Bloom, Griffith and Van 
Reenen (2000) find that changes in R&D tax credits have a large impact on the user cost of 
capital for R&D and that the long run elasticity of business R&D with respect to tax incentives 
may be substantial, on the order of 1.  Such studies do not necessarily prove that tax credits 
would be welfare enhancing overall, though.  A full cost benefit analysis would need to account   37
for the value of alternative uses for foregone tax revenues, the administrative costs of the R&D 
tax credit system and the various new distortions the tax scheme could itself introduce.   
Fiscal Incentives for FDI.  This section concludes with a look at policies to attract FDI and to 
enhance the benefits of FDI for the domestic economy, which are often rationalized on the basis 
of the technology transfers FDI is expected to bring.  A general point that emerges from the large 
research literature on the determinants and consequences of FDI 
34 is that the fundamentals that 
are important for encouraging and benefiting from capital investment as such - a friendly 
business climate, macroeconomic and  political stability, good quality infrastructure, a relatively 
open trade policy regime and availability of relatively skilled labor – are also important for FDI.   
Governments also use targeted policies to attract FDI, such as tax incentives, import duty 
exemptions, or land and power subsidies.  If FDI creates positive spillovers for the economy, 
there is a theoretical rationale for some government intervention.  However, as noted, the 
evidence for horizontal FDI spillovers is mixed, especially in developing economies.  There is 
evidence that domestic firms with high human capital and R&D receive more spillovers, and also 
that foreign firms that do R&D in the host country generate more spillovers.  But this provides a 
rationale for strengthening education, and perhaps for incentives to R&D done locally (whether 
by local or foreign firms) rather than for subsidizing FDI.  Given stronger evidence for vertical 
technology transfer between MNCs and developing country suppliers (Blalock and Gertler, 
2005), it is clear that policies that discourage FDI carry a high price tag in forgone technology 
and, all else being equal, should be avoided.  However this type of vertical technology transfer is 
internal to supply chain transactions and the benefits are realized by the supplier and the buyer.  
By itself such technology transfer does not provide a rationale for intervention.
35   
Overall, empirical research provides little conclusive evidence to warrant substantial 
fiscal incentives to promote FDI on welfare grounds.  Nevertheless, in the mid-1990s more than 
100 countries offered such incentives, a trend that continues. A survey of 45 developing 
countries found that 85 percent offered some kind of tax holiday or reduction of corporate 
income tax for foreign investment. (World Bank, 2005).  How effective are such measures?  
Most studies show that such incentives are only one among a set of relevant investment climate 
variables (of the sort outlined in the last paragraph). Indeed, the World Bank’s Investment 
Climate Surveys show that unreliable power supply, weak contract enforcement, corruption, and 
crime can impose costs several times greater than taxes.  A MIGA survey of 191 companies with 
plans to expand operations found that only 18 percent in manufacturing and 9 percent in services 
considered grants and incentives to be influential in their choice of location.
 Of 75 Fortune 500 
companies surveyed, only four identified them as influential.
36   
This does not mean that fiscal incentives are unimportant.  When other fundamentals are 
satisfied, they play a role in the choice of location.  Incentives can influence the choice of 
                                                 
34 Recent surveys of this work include Balasubramanyam, et al (2001) and Hanson (2001). 
35 Blalock and Gertler (2005) argue that there may nevertheless be an externality associated with vertical technology 
transfers that warrants some public intervention.  If a MNC transfers technology to only one supplier it could 
enhance the market power of and be “held-up” by that supplier.  Thus the MNC has an incentive to transfer 
technology to several competing suppliers, leading to a more productive supply base and lower prices.  However the 
MNC cannot prevent the new suppliers from also selling to the MNCs’ competitors, who will then be in a position to 
increase competition and lower prices in the downstream market.  The original MNC would not however take all 
these social welfare gains into account and may transfer a less than optimally amount of technology to suppliers.   
36 See World Bank (2005); MIGA (2002); Morisset (2003); Farrell, Remes and Schulz (2005); and Oman (2000).      38
location within regional groups like the EU, NAFTA or ASEAN, and also the kind of FDI that is 
attracted.  However, incentive packages can be quite costly through loss of tax revenue and 
hence of resources for government functions.  In Tunisia the costs of fiscal incentives amounted 
to almost 20 percent of total private investment in 2001.  The package India offered Ford in 1997 
was estimated to cost $200-420,000 per job.
37  Fiscal incentives also distort resource allocation, 
for example by discriminating against local investors, or by attracting short-term investors, and 
are often costly to administer. Tax holidays or temporary rebates in particular tend to attract 
investments typical of “footloose” industries and to reward the forming of new companies rather 
than continued investment in existing ones. Discretionary incentive regimes create uncertainty 
for investors and foster corruption, especially in countries without strong institutions.   
Given these costs, there has been a recent trend to eliminate or simplify tax incentives.  
Simple, predictable and non-discretionary incentive schemes will be attractive to investors even 
if they are not excessively generous, while being less costly for host countries.  Governments 
also increasingly try to attract FDI through investment promotion agencies (IPAs) that address 
possible information failures. There are now at least 160 national and more than 250 subnational 
IPAs, compared with only a handful two decades ago. These agencies play a variety of roles—
information dissemination; image building; investment facilitation; investment generation; 
investor monitoring and aftercare; and policy advocacy. 
Policies to enhance FDI spillovers.  Governments use a variety of trade related investment 
measures or TRIMs to try and enhance positive spillovers from FDI. Domestic content 
requirements aim to increase vertical technology transfer by requiring foreign firms to buy more 
inputs from local producers, although this may create a disincentive for FDI in the first place. 
Such requirements in the auto sectors in Chile and Australia resulted in large inefficiencies. 
(World Bank, 2005). McKinsey Consultants estimate that content requirements made cars 
produced in China 20-30 percent more expensive than in the U.S.  On the other hand the lack of 
or phasing out of local content requirements in the consumer electronics sector in China and the 
Mexican auto sector has not hindered the rapid development of sophisticated supplier industries 
in these countries. (Farrell, Remes and Schulz, 2005). 
Mandated joint ventures or local equity participation regulations also aim to encourage 
technology spillovers but can simply make foreign firms wary about using their most advanced 
processes, reducing potential spillovers.  Because of local partnership rules international 
investors in the auto sector in China were reluctant to use the latest processes, so that 
manufacturing methods have tended to lag industry standards by about 10 years. Kodak invested 
six times more in its one wholly owned subsidiary in China than in its various joint venture 
partners. Its subsidiary produced its most advanced film and camera technologies, while the joint 
ventures produced only conventional film.  On the other hand multinationals are often quite 
willing to form joint ventures with local partners when this makes economic and strategic sense, 
even without regulations, for example in the retail sector in Brazil and Mexico.  In recent years 
countries have tended to adopt more general strategies to work with foreign affiliates and local 
firms to overcome information and cultural barriers. These programs are often combined with 
incentives to help the domestic suppliers meet the production standards demanded by foreign 
investors. This approach has been followed in economies such as Ireland, Malaysia, Singapore, 
and Taiwan (China).  (World Bank, 2005).   
                                                 
37 Gorg (2003).   39
Appendix:  Estimating the knowledge diffusion model 
 
To investigate the intensity of knowledge flow in East Asia and beyond, the following 
double exponential knowledge diffusion model is estimated:
38  
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where i and j denote citing and cited countries respectively; citing patents are granted in year T 
and cited patents in year t; g is one of the six main technological fields. The left hand side is the 
citation frequency of patents of country i granted in year T citing country j's patents that are 
granted in year t in technological area g. It is computed as: 
jtg iT
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i.e., the number of cites scaled by the numbers of potentially citing and citable patents. It 
measures the empirical frequency of a patent from the group defined by iT citing a patent 
from the group with the characteristics of jtg. 
The probability that a patent is cited by another patent depends on among other things, 
the likelihood that the cited patent comes to the knowledge of the inventor of the citing patent 
and the relevance of the knowledge embodied in the cited patent to the citing patent. The former 
increases with the lag between the grant dates of the citing and cited patents (T-t) - the longer the 
cited patent has been around, the more likely it becomes known to the inventor of the citing 
patent, whereas the latter diminishes with the lag. As new knowledge emerges and/or as the wide 
adoption of the old knowledge reduces the economic rent accruable to the proprietary knowledge 
embodied in the cited patent, the likelihood that the cited patent remains relevant and prior art to 
a potential citing patent is reduced. The double exponential model in equation (A.1) captures 
these two processes with β1 measuring the speed of obsolescence and β2 the speed of diffusion. 
The first term of the right hand side of equation (A.1) contains the technology distance 
between the citing patents and the cited patents. The technology distance variable is defined as: 
jtg iT jtg iT V V TD ' , =  
where Vit is a 428-element vector of patent class shares of country i's USPTO patents granted in 
year t. TP is bounded between 0 and 1 and monotonically increasing in the similarity between 
two economies' patent portfolio, which we use to measure the  technological proximity between 
the two economies. The closer the potentially citing patent is to the potentially cited patent in the 
technology space, the easier it is for the citing patent to capture knowledge spillover from the 
cited patent and therefore the likelihood of citation increases. Finally, α(ij,T, t,g) represents a 
number of fixed effects we are interested in estimating: 
) exp( ) , , , ( ∑∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ + + =
ij T t g
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For each set of fixed effects (D’s), one reference case is left out in the estimation. The 
citing-cited country pair specific effect is estimated with the αij's. For example, with U.S. citing 
U.S. as the reference group αTWUS would measure how much more intensively Taiwan cites the 
U.S. relative to the U.S. cites itself. If the coefficient is estimated to be say 0.5, then it would 
                                                 
38 The model was first proposed and estimated in Caballero and Jaffe (1993) and was later estimated in Jaffe and 
Trajtenberg (1998) and Hu and Jaffe (2003).   40
imply that Taiwan cites the U.S. half as frequently as the US does. The citation frequency may 
also vary with the grant year of the citing patents; and this is captured by αT's. With both the 
effects of citing year and citation lag included, we are not able to estimate a full set of cited year 
effects of αt 's. Instead we group the cited year t's into groups and estimate the group effects. 
Lastly, we also allow the average citation frequencies of the six main technology fields to differ. 
Instead of estimating all the country pair effects in my citation database, which would 
lead to an explosion of the number of parameters to be estimated and overtaxing the data's 
identifying capability, we choose to be selective in the number of citing and cited countries to 
model. For cited countries, we include U.S., Japan, G5, Korea and Taiwan in view of their 
dominance in patent numbers and as a source of citations. All seven East Asian economies and 
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